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INTRODUCTION
At the height of the industrial revolution, the English courts
decided two cases in successive years that would have a
significant impact on the future of contract law. In the first
case, Lumley v. Gye,' the Court of Queens Bench assessed tort
damages because the defendant induced a breach of another's
contract with the plaintiff. The next year, in Hadley v.
Baxendale,2 the Court of Exchequer limited plaintiff's recovery
to "foreseeable" damages in a breach of contract claim.
While one was a tort case and the other contract, both cases
are easily seen as part of a judicial enterprise of making the law
more hospitable to contracting. In Hadley, the plaintiff claimed
lost profits due to the defendant's delay in transporting a mill
shaft. The court rejected the claim because the damages were
said to be unforeseeable at the time of contracting. Over the
years, commentators have taken Hadley as a decision that
limited the risks of contracting and thereby promoted the use of
contracts.3
In Lumley, Gye induced an already committed opera singer,
Johanna Wagner, to breach her contract with Lumley so Gye
could get a contract for her services for himself. Superficially,
nothing seems particularly surprising about the decision for
Lumley. At an intuitive level, Gye's conduct seems to smack of
1. 2 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
2. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
3. See generally Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the
Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STuD. 249 (1975) (analyzing the case
in its historical context as a judicial invention which standardized the rules of
contract and increased predictability).
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conversion or theft and may raise our restitutionary impulses:4
corrective justice seems to require that Gye pay Lumley the
value of the contract rights he apparently' "took" from Lumley.
From a broader perspective, by protecting Lumley's relationship
with Wagner in this way, the court arguably made contract more
dependable and therefore a more attractive legal device.
More recently, however, some commentators have implied
that Hadley and Lumley are not complementary, but are in
4. As Fuller and Perdue said in 1936:
The "restitution interest," involving a combination of unjust impover-
ishment with unjust gain, presents the strongest case for relief. If,
following Aristotle, we regard the purpose of justice as the mainte-
nance of an equilibrium of goods among members of society, the
restitution interest presents twice as strong a claim to judicial
intervention as the reliance interest, since if A not only causes B to
lose one unit but appropriates that unit to himself, the resulting
discrepancy between A and B is not one unit but two.
Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936) (footnote omitted).
As it turns out, Gye did not really "get" Wagner's performance, even though
he tried. Thus, the restitutionary impulse we may feel here is itself predicated
on the fact that Lumley v. Gye contains only part of the picture (the tort part).
In an earlier suit, a different court enjoined Wagner from performing for Gye
on the basis of the underlying contract. Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG. M. & G.
604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852). That Lumley recovered damages from Gye
notwithstanding the injunction against Wagner suggests that, while there may
be a restitutionary "feel" in a case like Lumley, restitution--disgorging a
defendant's unjust enrichment-is not the basis for the decision.
Two recent commentators confine their analysis to the situation in which
the inducer does appear to get the fruits of the earlier contract. See generally
Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L. REV. 877, 885 (1990);
Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible
Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19-26 (1987).
5. As noted above, Lumley succeeded in a suit against Wagner to enjoin
her from performing for Gye. Lumley, 1 DeF. M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687.
Contract damages for the profits lost due to Wagner's broken engagement would
have been difficult to establish, and specific performance of a personal service
contract would be barred. From what we know from the reporters, the
injunction left Lumley with an empty hall and Wagner with an empty calendar.
Characteristically, the suit against Wagner for the injunction and the later
suit against Gye for damages had no formal connection with one another. The
Lumley v. Gye court mentioned the earlier restraining order but did not suggest
that it had been violated. The Lumley v. Gye court saw the issue as whether
a person who "interrupts the relation subsisting.., by procuring the [promisor]
to depart from the [promisee's] service... commits a wrongful act for which he
is responsible at law." 118 Eng. Rep. at 752-53 (1854). Thus, the defendant's
destruction of Lumley's relationship, rather than the defendant's actual receipt
of an unjust benefit, was the primary focus of the tort decision.
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basic, irreconcilable conflict.6 Largely deploying various forms
of economic analysis, in particular the theory known as "efficient
breach," their arguments (which display a rigor that attracts
followers to the law-and-economics approach) challenge the core
of the principle established in Lumley. Simplified, the critics
observe that Gye's conduct, while opportunistic and disruptive,
brings to our opera singer a better offer, a buyer (Gye) who
values her services more than the first (Lumley) did. Therefore,
they argue, the promisor (Wagner) should breach, form the
second contract, and pay the first promisee contract damages to
yield an efficient outcome.7 The interference tort, they argue,
disrupts this ordinary process of finding and exploiting better
opportunities. Potential tort liability impedes the flow of
information from newcomers to those committed by contract and,
in that sense, retards economic development. The tort, they
argue, ought to be circumscribed or curtailed.
Much of this fundamental critique proceeds from an
extremely abstract, theoretical contract perspective,' a perspec-
tive that is particularly dependent on economic analysis and
associated instrumental reasoning. In contrast to the neoclas-
sical contract law that emerges from actual contract
6. These authors believe that when there is no wrongful conduct other
than interrupting a contractual relationship, the tort should be either
substantially circumscribed or eliminated altogether. See, e.g., Donald C.
Dowling, Jr., A Contract Theory for a Complex Tort: Limiting Interference with
Contract Beyond the Unlawful Means Test, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 487 (1986);
Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectan-
cies:A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1982); James
B. Sales, The Tort of Interference with Contract: An Argument for Requiring a
"Valid Existing Contract" to Restrain the Use of Tort Law in Circumventing
Contract Remedies, 22 TEx. TECH L. REV. 123 (1991); see also BeVier, supra note
4 (providing an analysis that would curtail the tort in many cases, but arguably
not in Lumley itself); David F. Partlett, From Victorian Opera to Rock and Rap:
Inducement to Breach of Contract in the Music Industry, 66 TUL. L. REV. 771
(1992) (examining the tort in the context of the entertainment industry); Gary
D. Wexler, Note, Intentional Interference with Contract: Market Efficiency and
Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CONN. L. REV. 279 (1994) (summarizing
the commentators and taking a position very strongly influenced by efficient
breach theory).
7. See generally Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Reme-
dies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111
(1981) (examining the existence of a connection between considerations of
morality and economic efficiency in contract liability).
8. See Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 329, 343 (1993) (suggesting that the highly theoretical bent of
much modern scholarship is part of a larger ebb and flow of legal thought).
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cases-messy, often difficult to reconcile, and reflecting both
individual and community values 9-this theoretical perspective
imagines contract as a system that is almost exclusively
individualistic and has mathematical order. Following the
simple logic of Williston's classical contract model, this
"contractarian" ° approach proceeds from the image of two
informed individuals, each attempting only to maximize her own
welfare through a private transaction. The design of the
transaction and its substance are the business of the parties,
and nobody else's. And because the parties are thought uniquely
qualified to design their transaction, the business of courts must
be limited to enforcing the deal as negotiated; judicial second-
guessing of the parties' exchange or its terms is condemned. 11
Critics proceeding from this classical contract paradigm have
found the interference cases challenging because they seem
inconsistent with "efficient breach," a central component and
logical extension of the individualist vision of contract. And
because of the inconsistency between the interference cases and
efficient breach theory, some scholars have rejected the tort
cases while others have attempted to reconcile them with the
outcomes their theories generate. Thus far, however, the
reconciliation has been, at best, partial. The theory of efficient
9. See generally Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The
Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 697 (1990)
(contrasting the expanding theoretical contractarian view of the nature of
contract with the actual nature of contract).
10. The term "contractarian" recently has been appended to the kind of
analysis that begins with hypothetical, "rational" individuals, asks what they
would want in various situations, and then projects legal rules from the
answers. See id. at 697-99 (describing the consent theory of contracts). The
term would include the "rational bargaining" model advanced by Professors
Baird and Jackson in the bankruptcy context, see generally Thomas H. Jackson,
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE
L.J. 857 (1982), and the "relational contract" analysis of Professors Goetz and
Scott in contracts, see generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles
of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981). Much of the law-and-
economics analysis currently on the scene deploys the contractarian model.
This approach to policy analysis goes back to the idea of a social contract,
used by political philosophers to derive philosophical principles. See generally
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JUsTICE 105-13 (1982).
11. Professor Jay Feinman presents a succinct summary of problems with
this individualist paradigm in Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default
Rules, 3 S.C. INTERDISC. L.J. 43, 52-53 (1993). Karl Llewellyn's critique of this
paradigm in the context of sales law came much earlier. See, e.g., Karl N.
Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939); Karl N.
Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. REV. 873 (1939).
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breach (as articulated by these recent critics, at least) cannot
coexist with the broad range of situations to which interference
doctrine applies.
This Article asserts that, rather than being in fundamental
conflict, Hadley and Lumley represent different, complementary
strains of analysis we have historically brought to the law of
transactions. If Hadley stands for individualism and the
proposition that one is not bound to that which one did not
"foresee,"'2 Lumley stands for the proposition that a contract
effects a union of individual interests that can have value
beyond the narrow self-interest of those who entered it. If
Hadley stands for the proposition that contract is nobody's
business but the parties', Lumley stands for a community's
interest in the maintenance of contracts and the relationships
they embody.
The Lumley line of cases finds courts preserving important
values that find no place in a rigorously individualist paradigm.
Trust and associated values of community and sharing, values
that may well have broader economic worth," are difficult to
embrace if we begin with the model of essentially selfish
individuals maximizing their own interests. But the paradigm
deployed by recent critics embodies only the individualist strain
and proceeds from a vision of contracting that probably never
existed in fact. The tort cases are bound to be substantially at
odds with an analysis that cannot recognize the community
values the decisions may embody.
Like promissory estoppel cases, good-faith cases, and other
"problem" cases that "classical" contract'4 has had to embrace
in becoming "neoclassic," " interference-with-contract cases
reflect, I believe, the notions of community that we bring to
12. The extension of the Hadley individualist strain materialized for a time
in the "tacit agreement" cases. Modem cases and the Uniform Commercial
Code reject the tacit agreement test. See U.C.C. § 2-715, cmt. 2 (1989).
13. They may even have value to the parties themselves. See generally
Scott E. Masten, Equity, Opportunism, and the Design of Contractual Relations,
144 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 180 (1988).
14. By "classical" contract, I refer to the contract doctrine developed by
Williston, Holmes, and others in the early twentieth century. The doctrine is
characterized by a strong emphasis on the individual and a rigorously logical
process of decision making. "Classical" contract is idealized in GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
15. I use "neoclassic" contract to refer to the formal contract rules currently
represented by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) and Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
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solving transactional problems."6 These cases at times recog-
nize relationships that contract doctrine would not and often
restrict individuals in situations where the logic of individualist
contract reasoning suggests they should be free. These tort
cases thus give occasion to reflect on policies that foster commu-
nity and trust within our broader law governing relationships
and to consider the implications of those usually quiet policies
for our formal law of contracts.
The interference cases are also an occasion to examine the
forms of "contractarian" reasoning that critics have used to
condemn the tort cases. Based on the individualist conceptions
of classical contract and more modern law and economics, this
normative approach to policy appears throughout the literature,
the cases, and contemporary political discourse. Contractarian
analysis, for example, has been in the center of debates about
fundamental assumptions in the' law of bankruptcy17 and
corporate governance.'" Embodying only the individualist part
of what our culture brings to transactional problems, 9
contractarian reasoning may be bound to yield distorted
recommendations, at least when measured against a broader
legal and cultural backdrop.2" The flaws in contractarian
16. We find many community values once we go outside the formal contract
system and consider the legal mix most lawyers would consider in advising
clients about proposed courses of action. The operative rules would then include
restitution and large parts of tort law; regulations coming from state and
federal legislation, such as consumer protection legislation and labor law; and
the ultimate limitation to individualist commitment, bankruptcy.
17. Compare Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (stating the only goal of
bankruptcy is to assist creditors in collections) with Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987) (asserting that the purpose of
bankruptcy is to distribute losses).
18. See A-4- Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The
Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991);
Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964). See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the
Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model for
Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 441 (1994).
19. Professor Marjorie Kornhauser develops the proposition that the
individualist rhetoric in our national politics stems from the "male" side of our
culture in Maijorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-progressive Income
Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987).
20. The flaws may well bias analysis in the direction of "social darwinism,"
the name historians give to a late-nineteenth century idea most closely
associated in the United States with Yale Professor William Graham Sumner.
John Kenneth Galbraith summarizes the movement and quotes Sumner: "The
millionaires are a product of natural selection .... They may fairly be regarded
1996] 1109
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analysis may well be more accessible in the interference tort
context because the analysis clashes most starkly with these tort
cases. Thus, an examination of these cases and the arguments
of their critics is an opportunity to highlight substantial flaws in
contractarian reasoning itself.
Part I will survey the interference case law to supply a
backdrop for the following Parts. Part II will look at recent
criticism of the tort and suggest that the "inconsistent" cases
show flaws in critics' theories rather than the other way around.
Having removed the individualist blinders, we will consider in
Part III the values the interference cases may embrace that are
not accessible through an individualist paradigm, as well as
some implications of those values for the scope of the interfer-
ence tort. The discussion ultimately will suggest that Lumley is,
indeed, best viewed as a close sibling of Hadley and that
interference-with-contract case law is best viewed as comple-
menting contract law by promoting sound policy that an
individualist conception of contract is structurally incapable of
advancing."'
If, as I suggest, we consider these cases as part of the larger
law governing contracts, the question the tort cases ultimately
raise is whether individualist paradigms should continue to
dominate neoclassical contract doctrine or whether, as some
have suggested, it is necessary to rethink the whole system in
as the naturally selected agents of society for certain work. They get high
wages and live in luxury, but the bargain is a good one for society." JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE CULTURE OF CONTENTMENT 80-81 (1992) (quoting
WILLIAM G. SUMNER, THE CHALLENGE OF FACTS AND OTHER ESSAYS 90 (Albert
G. Keller ed., 1914)). The proposition that the strongest ought to survive has
been a hotly debated political issue during the course of our history; if social
survival of the fittest is an implication of these normative approaches to policy
making, it should not be buried within an ideology proceeding from individual-
ism but should be subjected to open policy debate and democratic decision
making like other controversial social policies. Cf. Richard S. Markovits, A
Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of the Concept of
"The Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency": Why the Kaldor-
Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtually All Law-and-Economics Welfare
Arguments Are Wrong, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 485 (suggesting that law-and-
economics analysis is structurally biased towards the status quo).
21. There is nothing new to the proposition that "contract" and "tort" are
artificial divisions of a unified reality. Perhaps the most famous exposition of
the proposition is GILMORE, supra note 14, at 87-89. See also Robert Braucher,
Contracts, in AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD CENTURY THE LAW BICENTENNIAL
VOLUME 121 (Bernard Schwarz ed., 1976). What needs continual revisiting is
whether current (or recommended) artificial divisions make sense in solving
human problems.
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order to embrace currently excluded community values.
I. CASE LAW CONCERNING INTERFERENCE WITH
CONTRACT
A. INTRODUCTION
In Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,22 an angry Texas jury2
3
assessed three billion dollars in punitive damages against a
major oil company.24 Texaco's "wrong" had been to interfere in
a large, evolving sale of assets between Pennzoil and Getty Oil
to get Getty's assets for itself The size of the judgment
represents good (and perhaps bad) lawyering, to be sure. But it
also may reflect the jury's moral condemnation of Texaco's
conduct in this business setting,26 a kind of condemnation that
began in 1853 with Lumley v. Gye.
In that seminal case, Johanna Wagner (the promisor) had
contracted with Lumley to give operatic performances. Gye
induced her to perform for him rather than for Lumley2' and
was held liable for damages in tort for interfering with the
contract between Lumley and Wagner. Texaco and Lumley
represent a particular kind of interference case in which the
defendant does nothing more "wrongful" than induce a breach in
order to get the promisor's performance for himself. Tort cases
define interference with a fixed contract to be "wrongful" without
more. These "core interference" cases are a primary target of
22. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
23. The jurors in the case said, among other things, "We won't tolerate this
sort of thing in corporate America" and "We learned quite a bit about the oil
business and we were surprised at the loose ethics .... The message we wanted
to send was that we didn't want to see anyone else do the things that were
happening in this case." See STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., 2 CONTRACTs: LAW IN
ACTION 186 (1993).
24. The Texas appellate court required a remittitur of two billion dollars in
punitive damages, or it would order the case remanded. Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at
865
25. Texaco intervened before the Pennzoil-Getty sale closed. Predictably,
the central issue in the case turned out to be whether Pennzoil and Getty had
a contract, a prerequisite to tort recovery under New York law, at the time of
interference. See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text (explaining the
role of contract in the finding of tort liability).
26. The cynic might also explain the verdict as a product of regional and
other biases on the part of the jury.
27. 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
28. In the related case, a court enjoined Wagner from performing for Gye.
Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
1996] IIII
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the critics.
But while the tort was fashioned in Lumley with a defen-
dant simply attempting to get otherwise committed personal
services for himself,29 courts diversified the tort quite early,30
expanding it to situations in which the defendant did something
we could describe as "wrongful" in the process of disrupting an
ongoing relationship. In so diversifying, courts expanded the
tort from fixed-term contracts to contracts terminable at will and
to relationships not enforceable as contracts under contract
law.3
1
We could describe Smith v. Ford Motor Co.32 as such a
"wrongful act" case. Jack Smith had been employed as president
of an incorporated Ford Motor Company franchise. The
corporation employed him "at will"--it could fire him for any
29. As Fuller and Perdue expressed in 1936, when the defendant holds
something of the plaintiffs, the intuitive urge to correct the situation by
requiring restitution is strong. See supra note 4. It is probably no coincidence
that courts have permitted recovery for the plaintiff in interference cases based
on the defendant's profit resulting from the promisor's breach--essentially a
restitutionary measure. See, e.g., National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 348
N.E.2d 771, 774 (Mass. 1976) (awarding plaintiff $27,462, representing
approximately ten percent of defendant's sales tainted by a violation of consent
decree); cf. Zippertube Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 757 F.2d 1401, 1411-12 (3d Cir.
1985) (awarding a percentage of profits derived from breach); Colorado
Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1478-
79 (D. Wyo. 1987) (holding that restitution was available as a remedy for the
defendant's tortious interference with contract); see also Sandare Chemical Co.,
Inc. v. Wako Int'l, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (determining
amount of lost profit as a result of tortious interference with contract). See
generally Annotation, Recovery Based on Tortfeasor's Profits in Action for
Procuring Breach of Contract, 5 A.L.R. 4th 1276 (1981).
Two recent commentators limit their focus to the restitutionary situation
in which the defendant persuades the promisor to deliver the promised
performance to her instead of the promisee. BeVier, supra note 4; Epstein,
supra note 4.
30. See, e.g., Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossiter, 112 P.2d 631, 632 (Cal. 1941)
(upholding an action for breach of contract by unlawful means); Downey v.
United Weatherproofing Co., 253 S.W.2d 976, 976 (Mo. 1953) (awarding
restitution against competitor defendant for compelling plaintiffs customer to
cancel contract); Lamb v. S. Cheney & Sons, 125 N.E. 817, 817 (N.Y. 1920)
(holding that a malicious inducement to a third party to withdraw from
plaintiffs contract constituted an actionable tort); Raymond v. Yarrington, 72
S.W. 580, 580 (Tex. 1903) (exploring whether defendant is liable for a third
party's individual breach of contract). See generally Annotation, Liability for
Procuring Breach of Contract, 26 A.L.R. 1227 (1952).
31. See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text (examining these kinds of
cases).
32. 221 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. 1976).
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reason or no reason. Ford's franchise was similar-Ford could
terminate the franchise for any or no reason. When Smith
affiliated himself with the Ford Dealer Alliance, a group of Ford
dealers potentially antagonistic to Ford, Ford used its termi-
nation rights to pressure the local franchise to fire the plaintiff.
Smith could not recover on his employment contract because it
was terminable at will; and the local franchise would have had
no recourse against Ford under contract law if Ford had carried
out its threat and ended its franchise. Yet the North Carolina
Supreme Court sustained Smith's tort action against Ford for
interfering with his continued at-will employment.
33
What ties Lumley "core interference" cases and Smith
"wrongful act" cases together for the critics is their potential for
conflict with contract doctrine. The apparent conflict between
this area of tort law and contract law is, perhaps, more obvious
in a case like Smith. If there is no right against the promisor for
breach of contract, how can there be a right against a third party
for interfering with "it"?
Beyond the logical criticism is a serious problem in cases
like Smith of limiting the liability principle. The problem stems
from the very way an interference claim is articulated. 4
Because many forms of activity "interfere" to some extent with
others' profitable relationships, the potential for articulating
interference claims is vast.35 Once courts recognize tort claims
for interfering with relationships that do not amount to enforce-
able, fixed-term contracts, they must examine the nature of the
33. The at-will cases have triggered some critics' predictable logic: If the
franchise could terminate the plaintiff at will, how can it be tortious to induce
a termination? That criticism will be challenged below, infra text accompanying
notes 74-85. Suffice it to say here that simple logic proceeding from a contract
analysis does not explain the cases.
It is worth noting here that Smith is a paradox, at least when juxtaposed
with early interference cases. Smith can be read as protecting the plaintiffs
right to associate (and perhaps join forces) with his peers, the other dealers. By
contrast, the early history of the interference tort finds employers successfully
using the tort toprevent similar activity. Several early cases challenged unions
on the grounds that union activities interfered with employment contracts
between workers and their employers. PETER B. KUTNER & OSBORNE M.
REYNOLDS, JR., ADVANCED TORTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 159-61 (1989).
34. Cf Perlman, supra note 6, at 71-72; Francis B. Sayre, Inducing Breach
of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 674-75 (1923).
35. Many claims could be cast as interference claims. One could claim that
copyright infringement was an interference with the cash flow the copyright
represents. One could also frame an auto accident case as interference with
one's prospects for future income.
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plaintiff's interest and of the defendant's conduct and ponder the
related question of how to limit the scope of liability.3
6
Some critics have solved the hard problem of practical tort
limits by logical derivation from the contract system: If Smith
had no enforceable contract rights against his employer (they
argue), how could he have tort rights against someone who
interfered with his nonright to continued employment?" In
Part III, I will suggest that the logical criticism is inadequate;
moreover, if, as I assert, contract law merely serves an adminis-
trative function of limiting this area of tort liability, sound policy
suggests including at-will and other cases the critics would
exclude. 8
In contrast to cases like Smith, the issue raised in "core"
cases like Lumley and Texaco is not the appropriate limits to the
liability principle but the soundness of the liability principle
itself. Far more intensely and rigorously than in the past,
modern commentators focus directly on this core question: Why
does the law recognize an interference-with-contract claim even
in enforceable contract cases? Absent some independent basis
for liability, what exactly is "wrongful" about interfering with a
contract?39
36. Dean Perlman supplies excellent insight into the problems that
economic-loss cases like Smith present to the tort system. Perlman, supra note
6, at 70-76. In distinguishing economic loss from tort cases involving physical
damage, he wrote:
In cases of physical injury to persons or property, the task of
defining liability limits is eased, but not eliminated, by the operation
of the laws of physics. Friction and gravity dictate that physical
objects eventually come to rest. The amount of physical damage that
can be inflicted by a speeding automobile or a thrown fist has a self-
defining limit....
The laws of physics do not provide the same restraints for
economic loss. Economic relationships are intertwined so intimately
that disruption of one may have far-reaching consequences.
Perlman, supra note 6, at 71-72.
37. Epstein, supra note 4, at 23; Perlman, supra note 6, at 90-91.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 274-284.
39. The related question, "What got that Texas jury so mad?" is more a
cultural than a legal question. The Texas court hypothesized:
From the evidence, the jury could have concluded that Texaco
deliberately seized upon an opportunity to wrest an immensely
valuable contract from a less affluent competitor, by using its vast
wealth to induce the Museum, Gordon Getty, and Getty Oil to breach
an existing contract. The evidence shows that the wrongful conduct
came not from servants or mid-level employees but from top level
management. Apparently the jury believed that the conduct of
Texaco's top level management was less than the public was entitled
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
Here again, contemporary commentators enlisted contract
ideas in their enterprise. But they abstracted from real contract
law-that confusing, complex mix of individualist and collective
values-a simple, highly individualistic contract model (efficient
breach theory) and projected from that model a core criticism of
the wisdom of Lumley and the apparently strong jury revulsion
in Texaco. In Part III, I will suggest that both the method of
these critics and the substance of their criticism miss the mark.
Before turning to the critics' arguments, it is necessary to
briefly describe the target of their criticism, the case law.
Beyond setting the stage for the discussion to follow, a descrip-
tion of the tort's features will attest to the strength of the values
that may underlie liability.40 It will also demonstrate the
difficulties that emerge when this tort is juxtaposed with the
individualist conception of contract that critics rely on when
addressing this area of tort law.
B. SALiENT FEATURES OF THE INTERFERENCE TORT41
1. Intent, Privilege, and Competition
From the beginning, interference with contract has been an
intentional tort, and the basis for liability explained as the
"wrongful" activity of the defendant in interfering with the
contract. While "malice" is often used in the cases,42 it does not
mean ill will or actual maliciousness. Clearly, this is true even
to expect from persons of such stature. There is no evidence that
Texaco interfered with the contract to injure Pennzoil, but the jury
could reasonably conclude from the evidence at trial that Texaco cared
little if such injury resulted from its interference.
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 865 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
Whatever the jurors' real reasons, the fact that they were moved to assess
three billion dollars in punitive damages must be accounted for in developing
a view on the normative question whether the law should affix liability to the
offending conduct.
40. Part M infra will develop the argument that values of an expanded
community affected by two-party contracting are what underlie these tort cases.
41. See generally 2 FOWLER HARPER, ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 6.5-6.10
(1985); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 129-30 (5th ed. 1984); Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 888, 959-69 (1964).
42. Brennan v. United Hatters of N. Am. Local 17, 65 A. 165 (N.J. 1906);
Mangnum Elec. Co. v. Border, 222 P. 1002 (Okla. 1924); Temperton v. Russell,
1 Q.B. 715,62 L.J.Q.B. 412 (1893); Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q.B.D. 333,50 L.J.Q.B. 305
(1881); Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
1996] 1115
1116 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1103
in Lumley.43  In Smith v. Ford Motor Co.," the plaintiff did
not show that Ford bore ill will toward him; in that case,
"malice" was the functional equivalent of "without justification."
Courts do not require ill will toward the plaintiff in most
cases, 45 and therefore we cannot explain Lumley as embodying
a simple policy of penalizing a defendant for truly malicious
behavior.45
Bound up with the intent issue are the defenses to the tort
articulated under the infinitely adaptable terms "privilege" and
43. In Lumley, the term served as a rhetorical device. In the process of
expanding the claim beyond master-servant relationships to contracts generally,
Judge Crompton wrote:
[Ilt must now be considered clear law that a person who wrongfully
and maliciously or, which is the same thing, with notice, interrupts the
relation subsisting between master and servant by procuring the
servant to depart from the master's service .. commits a wrongful act
for which he is responsible at law.
2 El. & Bl. 216, 224, 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 752 (emphasis added).
Given that these cases arise in tort, and that the cases imply it is "wrong"
to interfere with certain business relationships, a showing of true "malice" will
be relevant to claimed punitive damages and, of course, will help advance a
plaintiff's cause in any event before a jury. Moreover, many cases seem to
suggest that malice in the ill-will sense is a material factor in actually finding
liability.
Professor Dobbs, among others, suggests that it is conceptually wrong to
differentiate between wrongful and nonwrongful acts on the basis of motivation
alone. Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34
ARK. L. REV. 335, 347-50 (1981). Dean Perlman rejoins that the law differenti-
ates on the basis of motivation all the time. Perlman, supra note 6, at 94-99.
44. 221 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. 1976). See supra text at note 32 (describing the
facts of Smith).
45. KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, § 129 at 982-89.
46. Cf Dobbs, supra note 43, at 347-50.
Intent does, however, play a role in imposing liability because knowledge
of the plaintiff's relationship and a defendant's act that will disrupt the
relationship are essential to establishing liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766 (1977). Comment I to the section provides: "To be subject to
liability under the rule stated in this Section, the actor must have knowledge
of the contract with which he is interfering and of the fact that he is interfering
with the performance of the contract. Id. § 766 cmt. I (emphasis added).
Comment j provides: "The rule stated in this Section is applicable if the
actor acts for the primary purpose of interfering with the performance of the
contract, and also if he desires to interfere, even though he acts for some other
purpose in addition." Id. § 766 cmt. j (emphasis added). Intent plays a
complicated role, however, because, as will be discussed in the next section, a
defendant can knowingly interfere with a contract and escape liability if a court
later finds the interference "justified" or "privileged." This complication makes
intent a useless tool in many cases for distinguishing actionable conduct from
that which will be permitted.
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"justification." One can interfere in another's relationship if one
has "privilege" to do so. The lack of clear standards for liability
and for placing the burdens of proof17 open this area to severe
criticism.4" Plessinger v. Castleman & Haskell"9 illustrates
the malleability of "privilege."
In Plessinger, plaintiff was an older lawyer and the defen-
dant was a law-firm client that wanted younger lawyers to
handle its files. This prompted the law firm to reduce the
plaintiff's pay and eventually ask him to leave the firm. After
he left, the plaintiff sued the client for interference with his
employment with the law firm. The court concluded that the
plaintiff stated a claim for relief, notwithstanding the
defendant's argument that it had an unfettered privilege to pick
its own lawyer. Discussing that aspect of the case, the court
said:
The Court believes that the California Supreme Court would not
recognize a client's unlimited right to select among associates employed
by a contracted law firm where the selection criteria involves discrimi-
nation against a member of a protected class. To hold otherwise would
allow law firm clients to demand that law firms not assign cases to
women, racial minorities or members of any other protected class, even
where the client intends to cause a breach or disruption of the business
relationship between the associate and the employing law firm.
Important though the attorney-client privilege may be, it should not be
available to shield interference with another's civil rights. 0
Cases like Plessinger and Smith are targets for criticism
because they are said to make it difficult to predict with any
accuracy the conduct that is subject to liability." The Ameri-
can Law Institute has been unable to distill the desired crisp
rules from the cases; the "black letter" of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts contains seven factors to be considered in
judging the propriety of the defendant's interference." The
47. There is disagreement whether plaintiff states a prima facie case
subject to the defense's proof of privilege or justification, or whether the absence
of privilege or justification is part of the plaintiffs proof. KEETON ET AL., supra
note 41, at 983-84.
48. Dobbs, supra note 43, at 345-46; Perlman, supra note 6, at 65.
49. 838 F. Supp 448 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
50. Id. at 451. A strong theme of age discrimination obviously underlies
these facts, see id. at 450-51, yet the case did not focus on civil rights, and the
plaintiff never sued the law firm for illegally discriminating against him.
51. Dobbs, supra note 43, at 345-46; cf Epstein, supra note 4, at 7; KEETON
ET AL., supra note 41, at 984.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 767 (1977). It provides:
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally
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multiple, relatively vague factors make predicting the outcome
of litigation very difficult. Commentators, searching for rules
that make clear the limits of business behavior, have responded
by recommending drastically scaling back the tort53 or at least
limiting it in all situations to enforceable, fixed-term con-
tracts. 4
The perceived vagueness of the liability principle is not
new;55 its resistance to this recurrent criticism suggests that
the tort may embody strong underlying values. Perhaps the
vague standards reflect a lack of consensus on the values that
are being embraced as well.56
Many interference cases involve a third party "competing"
with the promisee for the promisor's performance. Thus,
competition is a persistent "privilege" issue. This should be
obvious because, in a sense, a competitor always "interferes"
with its competitors' business relationships.
While leaving the contours of privilege and justification
fuzzy, the cases seem to have crystallized clear rules on this
recurrent issue. Broadly, the cases seem to agree that the
interfering with a contract or a prospective contractual relation of
another is improper or not, consideration is given to the following
factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor
and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interfer-
ence and
(g) the relations between the parties.
Id.
53. Professor Perlman would restrict the tort largely to situations in which
the defendant's conduct was "independently unlawful," that is, actionable under
some theory other than interference with contract, such as fraud or antitrust
law. Perlman, supra note 6, at 97-129. Little would be left of the tort as an
independent basis of liability under this formulation.
54. Professor Epstein justifies the tort in Lumley core cases but would
permit no tort action for contracts that are imperfect or terminable at will. He
writes, "It is only where the promisor is in breach that the promisee can be said
to have lost a property right." Epstein, supra note 4, at 21-25.
55. See Sayre, supra note 34, at 674-75 (discussing the lack of agreement
on the specific meaning of the individual elements of tort actions).
56. Cf Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1824-
25 (1994) (suggesting that "bright-line rules" tend to emerge when single
interest groups dominate a lawmaking process, whereas "vague, imprecise rules
and ambiguous standards" will emerge from a lack of consensus).
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defendant's competition with the promisee will not justify
interfering with an enforceable, fixed-term contract,57 whereas
it may justify interference with contracts terminable at will or
with less established or less firm business relationships."
Obviously, contract law is playing a role in sorting cases that
raise the defense of competition. And, as one would imagine,
competition is also a central component of the arguments that
challenge core cases like Lumley: free enterprise and efficiency,
say critics, demand that we not penalize a defendant merely for
bringing the promisor a better deal.59
New York and other states have embraced this competition
analysis and discriminate in their liability rules between fixed-
term contracts and contracts that are terminable at will. In
Terry v. Dairymen's League Cooperative Assn," the court
expressed this distinction:
The fact that the contract is terminable at will greatly broadens the
scope of the defendant's privilege [to compete with the plaintiff]. The
privilege in such a case is substantially the same as the privilege of
inducing third persons not to enter into new business relations with
the plaintiff ... On the other hand, the furthering of one's business
interests does not ordinarily justify the inducing of the breach of a
contract for a definite term. Thus, for example, one may not with
57. Wilkinson v. Powe, 1 N.W.2d 539 (Mich. 1942), illustrates the role
competition plays in the cases. In Wilkinson, the plaintiff had contracts with
farmers to haul their milk to the defendants' creamery. Id. at 540. Defendants
wanted the hauling work. To get that work (after an unsuccessful negotiation),
the defendants put the plaintiff to the expense of modifying its trucks, and
finally refused to take milk from the farmers except in defendants' own trucks.
Id. at 541. The farmers then broke their hauling contracts with Wilkinson.
The defendants argued that, as buyers, they had the privilege to take or refuse
milk from whomever they chose, and therefore their conduct in refusing milk
except on their own trucks could not be wrongful. Given Wilkinson's contracts
with the farmers, the court found that the decision to go to defendants' own
trucks was "done to accomplish an unlawful purpose, i.e., to bring about a
breach of contract." Id. at 543.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(2) & cmt. h (1977)
(distinguishing a competitor's ability to interfere with existing contracts as a
whole versus contracts terminable at will); KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, § 129,
at 978, § 129, at 987-88, § 130, at 1012-13 (describing intentional interference
as a basis for liability and the common law notion of competition allowing some
degree of interference); Perlman, supra note 6, at 106-08 (giving a historical
accounting of cases involving claims of interference with contract between
competitors).
59. Perlman, supra note 6, at 78-79 (quoting a member of the American
Law Institute stating that "some would find it astounding that the whole
competitive order of American industry is prima facie illegal"); Dowling, supra
note 6, at 488, 506-10.
60. 157 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1956).
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impunity seek to gain new customers by inducing them to breach their
existing contracts with others but, in the free play of competition, one
may seek to win for himself the patronage of the customers of others,
by inducing them to discontinue their existing business relations,
provided that they are terminable at will.61
Judicial statements in Terry and similar cases make it easy to
understand why competition would be a defense in some
interference cases. What is puzzling, particularly to recent
critics, is why competition is not a defense in all cases, including
fixed-term contract cases.
A tentative answer requires a closer examination of the
several critiques of the tort, the focus of Part II. Suffice it to
observe at this point that decision-makers have accorded more
weight to preexisting contracts than to a policy of competition;
and their willingness to recognize the tort and wrestle with the
competition defense in non-fixed-term contract settings6 2
suggests, again, strong values 3 accorded to preexisting rela-
tionships that seem in tension with a policy of unrestrained,
vigorous competition.
2. The Problem of Causation
Viewing the tort through the lens of an individualist
contract model generates causation problems, and those
61. Id. at 78-79 (citations omitted).
62. Where the excuse of competition is not present, New York permits a
plaintiff to bring an interference action even with respect to an at-will contract.
In Coleman & Morris v. Pisciotta, the court stated that interference with
contract is actionable if the motives of the actor were solely to produce damage
or the means used were unfair or dishonest. 107 N.Y.S.2d 715, 716 (1951). See
also Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 446
(N.Y. 1980); A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 144 N.E.2d 371, 375 (N.Y. 1957).
63. The statement in the text may be something of an understatement. The
very difficulty of adjudicating in this context itself suggests that strong values
underlie findings of liability; the course of least resistance for courts would have
been to stand on the status quo rather than to expand liability. But cf Dobbs,
supra note 43, at 335-44.
Courts are probably more aware than commentators that distinguishing
competition that is "fair" from that which is "unfair" is not an easy job that can
be done with litmus-test rules. There is likely to be widespread disagreement
within our culture about appropriate competitive limits. Moreover, courts no
doubt know that tinkering with competitive norms has a perceived effect on the
vigor of competition itself: business people will be less aggressive competitively
if competition can give rise to tort liability. Together, these factors suggest
strongly that the easy decision would have been to reject these interference
claims that so implicate our competitive system. That courts have not done so
attests not to their caving in to plaintiffs but to a powerful impulse to protect
ongoing business relationships from some forms of outside competitive pressure.
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problems also have attracted commentators.64 The promisor's
exit from the underlying agreement is the necessary event that
triggers the tort suit against the third party. Without the
termination of the relationship with the promisor, there is no
tort of interference with contract.65 But, if the promisor's
actions are a necessary ingredient to the tort claim, and if we
view the "harm" as the loss of the promisee's bargain, isn't the
promisor the primary cause of that loss? Put another way, why
doesn't the promisor's act of breach sever the causal connection
between the inducer's act and the promisee's harm?66
Our view of the underlying relationship generates this
causation problem. An analysis driven by an individualist
contract paradigm would view a contract as embodying only
reciprocal individual rights to the monetary equivalent of the
64. See generally 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 41, § 6.8; Epstein, supra note
4, at 26-28 (discussing issues of causal intervention and their relationship to
inducement of breach of contract).
65. In the process of attempting to induce a breach, a defendant might, of
course, commit some other tort against the plaintiff, such as defamation. See,
e.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing
a plaintiff to proceed with a cause of action, relying on defamation as a basis).
66. "Looked at from the traditional tort perspective, the chain of causation
appears to consist of missing links." Epstein, supra note 4, at 7. More than a
century earlier, Judge Colerege identified the same problem in two passages of
his dissent in Lumley:
[Tihere would be ... a manifest absurdity in attempting to trace up
the act of a free agent breaking a contract to all the advisers who may
have influenced his mind, more or less honestly, more or less power-
fully, and to make them responsible civilly for the consequences of
what after all is his own act, and for the whole of the hurtful conse-
quences of which the law makes him directly and fully responsible,
that I believe it will never be contended seriously.
Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 761 (Q.B. 1853).
According to all legal analogies, the bona fides of him who, by a
conscious wilful act, directly injures me will not relieve him from the
obligation to compensate me in damages for my loss. Again, where
several persons happen to persuade to the same effect, and in the
result the party persuaded acts upon the advice, how is it to be
determined against whom the action may be brought, whether they are
to be sued jointly or severally, in what proportions damages are to [be]
recovered? Again, if, instead of limiting our recourse to the agent,
actual or constructive, we will go back to the person who immediately
persuades or procures him one step, why are we to stop there? The
first mover, and the malicious mover too, may be removed several steps
backward from the party actually induced to break the contract: why
are we not to trace him out? Morally he may be the most guilty... if
we go the first step, we can shew no good reason for not going fifty.
Id. at 762.
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bargained-for performances.67 If one starts there, then the
"harm" caused by the third party has been the loss of that
monetary equivalent. Since it is the promisor that didn't pay it,
she certainly seems a more direct source of that harm than is
the inducer, and causation becomes a problem.
68
One can maintain an individualist perspective and avoid the
causation obstacle by recognizing that contract damages and
actual performance are not the same either qualitatively or
quantitatively. The interferer has caused quantifiable harm by
"causing" an expectation of actual performance to change to a
monetary claim for damages. The defendant has certainly
caused that harm, and the tort system implicitly seems to
recognize it. 69 The tort's persistence in the face of this causa-
tion problem, announced first in Lumley itself,7" suggests
perhaps a widespread recognition that a contract performance
and a right to contract damages are not the same thing, however
one reads Holmes.7'
Causation problems also disappear if we break free of the
constraints of the individualist paradigm and consider the
association between the promisor and promisee as a "relation-
ship" that consists of more than the reciprocal rights to the
67. Cf Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462
(1897) ("The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you
must pay damages if you do not keep it[]-and nothing else."). Viewing contract
as a right to the promisor's performance would translate into a right to specific
performance for breach of contract, a remedy permitted in comparatively few
cases under contract law.
68. Related to the causation issue is an aspect of promisor autonomy:
saddling the inducer with liability could suggest that the induced promisor had
less autonomy than we would like. See Dobbs, supra note 43, at 358 (stating
that a reasonable assessment of accountability will put blame on the person
who makes a decision).
69. Professor BeVier's critical analysis approves of the tort in situations
where full performance would be most unlikely to be reproduced by a contract
damage award. See BeVier, supra note 4, at 926-27.
70. See Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. at 761 (discussing the "absurdity" of tracing
the causation of a broken contract).
71. See Holmes, supra note 67, at 462 (stating that contract is not a right
to specific performance). The efficient breach theory, likely proceeding from
Holmes's statement, implies (by assuming away both transaction costs and all
harm not recognized by contract doctrine) that actual performance and
expectation damages are the same thing. See infra text accompanying notes
137-144 (discussing the efficient breach theory). It would be hard to ascribe
such a view to Holmes.
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other's actual performance. 2 Viewed in this way, the third
party has interfered with a relationship that has value indepen-
dently of and beyond the actual performances the parties
expected from one another under their contract. Causation is
direct and simple because the plaintiff's relationship with the
promisor is not coextensive with "contract." The wide acceptance
of liability for third-party interference with contracts suggests
that, in this context at least, courts may well regard the
relationship as socially valuable in its own right, valuable (to the
parties and perhaps to others) beyond the rights to damages for
breach that the individual parties have against one another."
72. Leon Green identified the interest as a "relational interest" in a classic
series of articles in the 1930s. See generally Leon Green, Relational Interests
(pts. 1-4), 29 ILL. L. REV. 460 (1934) (discussing family relations); 29 ILL. L.
REV. 1041 (1935) (discussing trade relations); 30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935)
(discussing commercial relations); 30 ILL. L. REV. 314 (1935) (discussing
professional and political relations).
Richard Epstein, who did not criticize the tort on the basis of efficient
breach, eased the causation problem by calling the right of the promisee
"property" owned by the promisee. Epstein, supra note 4, at 27. For Epstein,
the defendant's act of interfering with that property was analogous to acts
interfering with more common forms of property, such as real estate and
chattels. Id. The tort then is like trespass and conversion, both of which are
complete when the property interest is invaded by the defendant. See id.
Professor Epstein's thesis that this tort is analogous to trespass and
conversion means that, like those torts, there should be no requirement of an
actual act of inducement by the third party in Lumley-type cases, only receipt
of the performance owed to plaintiff and notice that the earlier contract exists.
He recognizes that precedent does not support him in dispensing with the
requirement of inducement in these cases. Id. at 28 n.70. Interestingly, a
major thrust of Leon Green's 1930s articles was that courts' use of "property"
when analyzing interference cases should be abandoned because of its capacity
to confuse. Green, supra, at 29 ILL. L. REV. 461-62.
73. The difficulties in the tort cases that come from the complexity of
establishing cause in fact-of actually proving that the defendant "caused" the
plaintiff an injury-also attest to the strength of the tort's animating values.
Showing "cause" here means showing that, but for the interference, the
promisor would have performed and the plaintiff would have received benefits
under the contract. This sometimes presents the plaintiff with conceptually
difficult proof problems. Often, for example, the underlying contract will
contain conditions that have not occurred at the time of the interference and
breach. Brokerage and lawyer contracts are common examples. See, e.g.,
Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 363 P.2d 310, 311 (en banc) (Cal. 1961)
(describing action by attorney against an insurance company for intentional
interference with contractual relations); Richette v. Solomon, 187 A.2d 910, 923
(Pa. 1963) (awarding damages for interference with a lawyer-client relation-
ship).
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3. Voidable, At-Will, and Non-Contracts
A third problem area which is related closely to the cau-
sation issues discussed above involves cases that sustain a tort
remedy where no remedy under contract law would lie. The
contract-driven critique rests, ultimately, on logic: If the other
party to the relationship could walk away from the plaintiff-
promisee without incurring liability, how can it be tortious for a
defendant to induce the walking away? The cases that go
beyond "contract" offend our senses of symmetry and system
integrity; where those values seem to be in the ascendancy, the
tendency of commentators is, once again, to define the outer
limits of tort liability through the contract system.74
The range of situations where these cases thwart contract
logic is broad. Courts have held, for example, that the
promisor's statute of frauds defense to the underlying contract,
or defects in other formal requisites under contract law, will not
block a tort suit against the interferer.75 In this kind of case,
the parties' actual intent cannot figure into the analysis
7 6
because the contracting parties did not consciously choose
74. Dean Perlman, for example, wrote:
Rules regulating third-party interference should advance whatever
policy contract law pursues in withholding enforcement of an agree-
ment. . . . If the efficiency principles of contract law suggest that a
third party using lawful means should not be liable for inducing breach
of enforceable promises, then a fortiori, the same rule should apply to
unenforceable expectancies.
Perlman, supra note 6, at 90-91. See generally Gina M. Grothe, Note,
Interference with Contract in the Competitive Marketplace, 15 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 453 (1989).
75. See, e.g., Musselman Bros., Inc. v. Dial-Huff & Assoc., 826 S.W.2d 838,
840 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 820-21 (Tex.
1969); F.D. Hill & Co. v. Wallerich, 407 P.2d 956, 959 (Wash. 1965). Lack of
"mutuality" or similar invalidity also does not always block an action. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. O'Neill, 317 P.2d 440, 443 (Kan. 1957) (stating lack of mutuality is
not a defense for preventing consummation of a contract); Cook v. MFA
Livestock Ass'n, 700 S.W.2d 526, 528-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating there is
no requirement for a valid contract to maintain an action for interference with
contract); Aalfo Co. v. Kinney, 144 A. 715, 716-17 (N.J. 1929) (finding even
when a contract is unenforceable, third parties may not maliciously prevent
performance). See generally, James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Liability for
Interference with Invalid or Unenforceable Contract, 96 A.L.R. 3d 1294 (1980)
(providing material on both sides of the debate over whether liability should
attach to interference with contract).
76. See Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg., 406 N.E.2d 445,454
(N.Y. 1980) (dissenting opinion) (emphasizing the distinction between voidable
and terminable at-will contracts regarding interference from third parties).
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unenforceability."
The proximity of contract law in this instance generates a
debate about whether we should supplement the contract system
with a tort remedy or whether we should maintain the integrity
of the rules within the contract system by limiting tort recovery.
Thus, some recent commentators have condemned these cases as
undercutting restrictions on recovery set within the contract
system,"8 while others have taken the opposite tack by suggest-
ing that the absence of a remedy within the contract system is
a strong reason for supporting liability in these kinds of cases.7 9
More controversial and more common are at-will contract
cases in which the parties agree that either of them can end the
relationship without the other's consent. Ordinary employment
is also often at-will and, as Smith v. Ford Motor Co. shows, 0
courts have used tort law to give plaintiffs recoveries when the
contract system would have failed them.8' Because the parties,
77. If one of the parties were conscious of the bar to enforceability and the
other were not, a doctrine such as estoppel might well limit later use of the bar
against the other party. Cf E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.12 (2d ed.
1990) (discussing contract enforcement by estoppel based upon a party's
reliance).
78. See supra note 75 and accompanying text; cf Epstein, supra note 4, at
23 (arguing that "if a party is free to leave, for whatever reason, then a third
party is free to induce him to depart"). Professor BeVier confined her analysis
to situations involving enforceable contracts. See BeVier, supra note 4, at 884
(discussing "inducers with notice of... enforceable contracts"). See generally
Dobbs, supra note 43 (arguing that the tort, when applied even to fixed-term
enforceable contracts, was overbroad).
79. See John Danforth, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion
of Society's Interest in Commercial Stability of Contractual Integrity, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1491, 1493 (1981) (proposing a reformulation of the interference with
contract tort, based upon the importance of contracts to commercial stability);
Dowling, supra note 6, at 513 (advocating broader liability based on the
distinction between interference with contract and interference with business
relations).
80. 221 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. 1976). For a description of Smith, see supra text
accompanying notes 32-33.
81. Smith, 221 S.E.2d at 296 (holding that an employee can successfully
state a cause of action against a third party for malicious interference with his
at-will employment contract even though the employer did not breach the
contract). Cases that give recoveries to at-will employees against their
employers for retaliatory discharges are just as controversial. See, e.g., Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336-37 (Cal. 1980) (holding that an at-
will employee who was discharged because he refused to fix gasoline prices
illegally can maintain a wrongful discharge tort action against his employer).
For two strongly contrasting views of at-will employees' use of tort law, compare
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
954 (1984) (arguing that courts should "bear a heavy burden of justification
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in theory, have "chosen" 2 to permit one another to end the
relationship unilaterally, some critics argue that interference
liability in the at-will context undercuts not only formal contract
law but the intent of the contracting parties as well. 3
The actual range of liability for interfering with at-will
contracts is considerably circumscribed because, as discussed
above, the law recognizes in these cases a broad privilege of
competition. 4 Thus, a defendant will incur no liability for
persuading an at-will employee to work for her instead of his
current employer.85 Yet while current law limits the range of
cases by recognizing the privilege to compete, extending liability
to any at-will case logically conflicts with an analysis that begins
with individualist notions of contract law. That the courts have
rejected this logic and extended liability anyway suggests, I
believe, that they see more in the underlying relationships than
"contract rights."
Having taken this brief tour of the legal terrain, we are
ready to consider what the critics have to say about it.
every time they wish to substitute their own judgment for that of the immediate
parties" to the contract) with Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At Will
Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA.
L. REV. 323, 408-09 (1986) (contending that courts are justified in interfering
with the at-will doctrine, especially when the employee has worked for an
employer for a long time and has developed a specific investment in and
relationship with the employer).
82. Professors Epstein and Linzer disagree fundamentally on whether
employee choice is involved in the employment contract, which is the predomi-
nant at-will contract. See Linzer, supra note 81, at 409-15 (attacking Epstein's
argument that at-will contracts benefit employees by arguing that employees
do not have a strong bargaining position).
83. E.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 22-23 (arguing that allowing any action
against a third party for inducing contract termination handicaps competitive
markets and ignores the mutual rights of the parties in at-will contracts).
84. KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 987-88.
85. Harley & Lund Corp. v. Murray Rubber Co., 31 F.2d 932, 933-34 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 872 (1929); Triangle Film Corp. v. Artcraft Pictures
Corp., 250 F. 981, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1918); American Bldgs. Co. v. Pascoe Bldg.
Sys., Inc., 392 S.E.2d 860, 863 (Ga. 1990); Boyce v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co.,
580 A.2d 1382, 1390 (Pa. Super. 1990); Hechler Chevrolet, Inc. v. General
Motors Corp. 337 S.E.2d 744, 748 (Va. 1985). Professor Epstein's criticism of
the at-will cases for chilling legitimate competition for employees seems wide
of the mark in this respect. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 21-22 (arguing that
allowing any action against a third party "for inducing contract termination
would place a major crimp in the operation of competitive markets").
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II. THE CRITICAL CHALLENGES AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACTS
Much of the recent scholarship on the tort of interference
with contract has taken a normative tone and advocates either
limiting or eliminating the tort. The criticism proceeds on a
number of fronts. A central feature is its tendency either to
emphasize or de-emphasize the underlying relationship (contrac-
tual or otherwise) between the original parties.
A number of critics challenge the entire field of "interfer-
ence" liability that includes not only the Lumley-type cases but
also cases like Smith86 and Plessinger" They find the range
of liability intolerably broad and make recommendations for
limiting liability in various ways.
Some of these critics would limit liability by concentrating
on the conduct of the intentional tortfeasor 5 They tend to
reject liability if a defendant has "merely" interfered with a
contract (because there is no "bad" conduct) but recognize it in
"wrongful act" cases like Smith. 9 These critics either suggest
or imply that the contractual or other relationship between the
original parties is comparatively unimportant and should have
less significance than it currently has within the case law.
In contrast with critiques that would move the focus away
from the contract or relationship between the parties, another
form of "vagueness" criticism puts contract law at the center of
its critique. This critique implies that contract law has been
insufficiently recognized in the cases. Most of these critics would
limit the tort to cases in which there were "valid, enforceable
86. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 221 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. 1976).
87. Plessinger v. Castleman & Haskell, 838 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
88. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 43, at 347-50.
89. See Dobbs, supra note 43, at 365-66 (arguing that liability should exist
when the defendant commits a tort, independent of interference analysis);
Perlman, supra note 6, at 97-129 (contending that the interference tort should
be limited to cases in which the defendant's acts are independently unlawful).
Professor BeVier focuses her analysis on the "inducement tort," which is found
in situations in which the interferer obtained the performance that was
promised to the plaintiff. Within that subset of cases (which does not include
cases such as Smith), she believes that the traditional tort doctrine, which
applies to all contracts, is overbroad and that ideally it should be narrowed to
permit liability in a smaller group of the inducement cases. BeVier, supra note
4, at 929-36.
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contracts." ° They tend to recognize liability for "merely"
interfering with a valid, enforceable contract but probably reject
it in an at-will case like Smith.91
By far the most provocative critiques have been those that
directly challenge the "core" principle established in Lumley
itself. Some of the critics focus only on the "core" cases,92 while
others attack the Lumley principle in the context of formulating
a "wrongful act" approach.93 These critics assert that there
should be no liability94 (or severely restricted liability)95 for
merely interfering with an enforceable contract.
What these various critiques share is their tendency to
undervalue the relationship (contractual or otherwise) between
the original parties and to overvalue the importance of contract
law. Either way, an individualist vision drives much of the
analysis, and this vision tends to equate the real value for policy
purposes of the underlying relationship with the legal status
contract law confers.
If, as I believe, the interference cases reflect the community
strain in our culture that is in tension with (or may contradict)
our individualist strain, these criticisms are bound to miss the
mark.
But there is a larger point that I believe is demonstrated by
the inconsistency between interference-with-contract cases and
an individualist critique of them: the contractarian analysis will
always miss the mark because it proceeds from a limited and
artificial vision of our culture, a vision that is historically,
90. One critic, however, argues the opposite. On the basis of an adequate
contract remedy in the enforceable contract case, he would permit the tort when
a contract does not exist but restrict the tort when there is a valid enforceable
contract. See Dowling, supra note 6, at 510-19; see also infra text accompanying
note 147 (explaining Dowling's argument).
91. See, e.g., Danforth, supra note 79, at 1515-17 (stating that extending
liability to include interference with at-will contracts is a fundamental error);
Epstein, supra note 4, at 21-24 (arguing that there should be no liability in at-
will cases).
92. See generally BeVier, supra note 4; Epstein, supra note 4.
93. See generally Dobbs, supra note 43 (arguing that there is no sound basis
for a universal rule of liability); Perlman, supra note 6 (proposing unlawful
means test to determine liability for interference with economic expectancies).
94. Dobbs, supra note 43, at 347-50; Dowling, supra note 6, at 510-19;
Perlman, supra note 6, at 97-129.
95. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 4, at 929-36 (arguing that inducement tort
is overbroad); cf Partlett, supra note 6, at 790-835 (exploring inducement to
breach of contract tort and arguing that it should be confined to protecting
contractual relationships).
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legally, and politically unreal. As a result, I suggest that
normative recommendations proceeding from this rigorously
individualist perspective will not reliably point in the right
directions and will often point in wrong ones.
We will begin by examining the "wrongful act" critiques that
tend to undervalue the parties' existing relationship, and proceed
from there to examine the critiques that would use formal
contract law to draw boundaries for the tort. Then we will
consider those "core" critiques suggesting that contract policy
requires a curtailment or rejection of Lumley.
A. 'VRONGFUL ACT" CRITIQUES: SUBORDINATING THE REALITY
OF THE RELATIONSHIP
Whatever their ultimate policy recommendations, the most
fundamental problem that has moved critics to protest is a want
of clarity in the values being advanced by the tort and a related
lack of clear lines separating actionable and nonactionable
situations.96 Under the Restatement, interference with contract
is actionable if it is "improper."" This vagueness in the
standard for liability tends to send cases to the jury in more
situations than critics think desirable."
A 1979 Alaska case reveals some of these basic problems.9
96. Many recent commentators believe that the tort suffers from over-
breadth and then define an analytic structure to show what the 'proper"
breadth should be. BeVier, supra note 4, at 929-31; Dobbs, supra note 43, at
365-76; Perlman, supra note 6, at 97-129.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
98. Keeton notes that the Restatement's list of seven factors specified for
determining liability is "not a list that would inspire one to predict an outcome,
or decide one's rights or duties." See KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 984 n.63;
see also supra note 52 (quoting the Restatement's criteria).
Vague standards also often result in a distaste for the judicial discretion
that comes with them and a disappointment with the expansion of tort liability
in this business area that contract law tends to dominate. See, e.g., BeVier,
supra note 4, at 935-36 (attributing the social costs of courts' difficulties with
distinguishing between intentional inducement to breach an existing contract,
actionable interference with advantageous relationships, and permissible
competitive behavior to courts' policing fairness of competitive process); Dobbs,
supra note 43, at 367-68 (discussing the tort of interference with contract as a
restraint on trade).
99. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Aurora Air Serv., Inc., 604 P.2d 1090
(Alaska 1979). Both Professor Dobbs and Dean Perlman found Alyeska
troubling. See Dobbs, supra note 43, at 348-50 (usingAlyeska facts to illustrate
problems with allowing judge or jury to assess motive instead of conduct);
Perlman, supra note 6, at 65-67 (disagreeing with the Alyeska court's decision
to base liability on the fact of interference instead of the nature of the
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RCA (the plaintiff's promisor) contracted with Alyeska (the
eventual defendant) to construct and maintain a communications
system along the Alaska pipeline. In turn, RCA contracted with
plaintiff Aurora to give RCA transportation services necessary
to perform the Alyeska-RCA communications contract. The
Alyeska-RCA contract gave Alyeska the unilateral right to
modify the communications contract; the RCA-Aurora contract
gave RCA the right to terminate the transportation contract if
it were in its "best interest" to do so. When Alyeska took over
the transportation function in the Alyeska-RCA communications
contract, RCA terminated Aurora's transportation services."°°
Aurora and Alyeska had not been strangers, however. They
had been parties to an earlier contract that ended badly, which
furnished Alyeska (Aurora alleged) with a motive for retaliation
against Aurora.'' Thus, when Alyeska changed its contract
with RCA to make Aurora's services unnecessary, Aurora
responded by suing Alyeska for interference with the RCA-
Aurora contract.
Alyeska challenged an adverse jury verdict claiming it had
a legal right to take over the transportation services and,
therefore, that the exercise of this right could not be tor-
tious. °2 The Alaska Supreme Court rejected these arguments
and sustained a damage verdict. °3 Because there had been
ample facts for a jury to conclude that retaliation had been the
dominant reason for taking away Aurora's business, whatever
privilege the Alyeska contract otherwise conferred was gone.104
interfering act).
100. Alyeska, 604 P.2d at 1092-93.
101. Aurora had brought suit on that contract, and Alyeska paid Aurora the
sum claimed due shortly after the suit began. Id.
102. Id. The defendants made similar arguments in Smith v. Ford Motor
Co., 221 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. 1976) and Plessinger v. Castleman & Haskell, 838 F.
Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1993). Ford argued that, because it had a right to
terminate its franchise with its dealer corporation, it could not be tortious to
threaten an exercise of that right in order to pressure the dealership to
terminate the plaintiff. Smith, 221 S.E.2d at 285. In Plessinger, defendant
Allstate argued that it had an unfettered right to choose its lawyer; accordingly,
its pressuring the law firm to supply a younger lawyer could not be tortious.
Plessinger, 838 F. Supp. at 450-51.
103. Alyeska, 604 P.2d at 1098-99. Because of a jury error in computing
damages, however, the court directed the trial court to order a remittitur or, if
Aurora did not agree with the amount, a new trial. Id.
104. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Aurora Air Serv., Inc., 604 P.2d 1090,
1093-94 (Alaska 1979). The court noted that Alyeska had to exercise its rights
under its contract with RCA in "good faith" and that there was enough evidence
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What has troubled critics about this kind of case is the fact-
sensitive nature of the ultimate liability question that we reach
through the rubric of "privilege." The Alaska court rejected
Alyeska's claim to absolute "privilege" and, instead, said it was
a jury question whether Alyeska had operated in "good faith"
under its contract with RCA."0 5 Because the result in Alyeska
thus seems to turn on fact-sensitive motive, Professor Dobbs
condemned the case.0 6
At a doctrinal level, this vagueness problem is endemic to
the way we now conceptualize liability for interference with
contract. The law has long recognized that the defendant's own
interests, whether contractual or otherwise, often justify
interference with another's contract-that is, not all interfer-
ences should be actionable.' But once courts begin recogniz-
ing privileges within infinitely varied business settings, the
result is a case-by-case process that, if "restated," inevitably
produces fuzzy doctrine 0"
There are very limited solutions to this problem. One could
solve the predictability problem with alternative regimes of no
privileges or no liability. Commentators have been drawn to the
latter solution, but have sought to preserve the cases that seem
justifiable in their result. This has prompted them to pin
liability on the "wrongfulness" of the tortfeasor's act. "Mere"
interference with another's contract, in itself, would not be
for a jury to conclude that it had not. Id. at 1094.
This, of course, makes the case somewhat similar to more traditional
contract cases, which limit discretion within a contract to that exercised in
"good faith." Indeed, the proposition is sufficiently well established that we find
it in many places in the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(19)
(defining good faith); § 1-203 (imposing obligation of good faith in performing
every contract within the Act); § 2-103(1)(b) (defining good faith for a merchant);
§ 2-305(2) (requiring fixed price to be established in good faith); § 2-306
(requiring output to be determined in good faith).
105. Alyeska, 604 P.2d at 1093.
106. Dobbs, supra note 43, at 349-50.
107. See, e.g., Hopper v. Lennen & Mitchell, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 319, 326-28
(S.D. Cal. 1943) (recognizing that there are situations in which the defendant
can justify interference), rev'd on other grounds, 146 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1944).
108. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 attempts to define "improper."
See supra note 52 (quotingRestatement's seven factors for determining whether
interference is improper). Nonetheless, these seven factors hardly supply a
formula for accurately forecasting liability in most cases. See supra note 98
(quoting Keeton's opinion that the criteria fail to establish predictable
outcomes).
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"wrongful" in most cases. °9 Thus, it would not be interference
with contract that is the "wrong"--it would be sex discrimi-
nation, or age discrimination, or some other undesirable conduct.
Under Dean Perlman's formulation, courts would deploy an
"unlawful means" test."0 Similarly, Professor Dobbs identified
at least six categories of cases for imposing liability."'
If a desire for certainty motivates the reformulations, one
wonders whether varying sets of "wrongful act" categories would
help matters much."' The classifications proposed by com-
mentators are not entirely based on preexisting torts or statu-
tory offenses; the categories would be soft-edged, would evolve
over time through case law, and would be open to interpretation."
109. Professor Dobbs would permit an action for "mere" interference where
the plaintiffs contract was one for which she could obtain specific performance.
See Dobbs, supra note 43, at 373-76 (stating that the equity courts could
perceive a contract to buy property not merely as a contract in which property
would be transferred in the future, but to some extent as vesting a present
interest in the buyer); cf. BeVier, supra note 4, at 929-31 (proposing reformu-
lation of the inducement puzzle because the inducement tort is overbroad).
110. Dean Perlman wrote:
[A cohesive] doctrine can be developed best by shifting the focus in
interference cases from the fact of interference to the nature of the
interfering act. Two distinct categories of interference cases then
emerge: those in which the defendant's act of interference is indepen-
dently unlawful, and those in which the defendant's behavior is
otherwise lawful.... I propose an unlawful means test that restricts
tort liability to those cases in which the defendant's act is indepen-
dently wrongful.
Perlman, supra note 6, at 62. While a major thrust of Dean Perlman's analysis
is the incompatibility of the tort with the efficient breach theory, his point of
departure was the infinite variety of fact situations in which interference was
possible and the resulting vagueness of the standard for liability. See Perlman,
supra note 6, at 61-62, 128-29.
111. Some of the categories contain more than one item. For example, his
second category is "[n]on-tortious misconduct: duress, undue influence and
breach of fiduciary duty." Dobbs, supra note 43, at 366.
112. Beyond eliminating liability in the cases in which there were no
"unlawful means" employed, Dean Perlman believed that his test would better
direct attention to the defendant's conduct in those unlawful means cases where
he thought there should be liability. See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 6, at 118.
The cases already consider the defendant's conduct, however, through the
vocabulary of "wrongfulness" and "privilege." It is questionable whether there
would be much gain in clarity under a different formulation.
113. Moreover, a categorizing approach might actually cause a loss in
predictability by yielding a case law that was less articulate in explaining
results than the current standard. Instead of articulating the underlying basis
for condoning or condemning the defendant's conduct, the judicial enterprise in
the cases actually litigated would be to explain why a case fit a particular
category.
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But more to the point of the argument here, the tension
between the vagueness inAlyeska's "good faith" analysis and the
commentators' search for something more certain resembles the
tension between fuzzy limitations on individual autonomy, such
as neoclassical contract's "promissory estoppel," and classical
contract's individual autonomy-based rules such as "consid-
eration."" 4 The duty of "good faith" thrust upon Alyeska is (as
is most of tort) a limitation on individual freedom engendered by
the community strain in our culture. From the perspective of
community, it seems quite unremarkable to expect a large
corporation not to alter its own contracts for the purpose of
injuring another business in a very predictable way.
The problem of predictability that comes with fuzzy "good
faith" is not much different from the uncertainty that businesses
live with in their relations with one another every day. Rigorous
individualist classical contract doctrine purported to offer
businesses the certainty that some thought desirable. In the
process, that rigid structure obscured judicial decision-mak-
ing."5  Neoclassical contract has displaced some autonomy-
based rules with ideas that are inconsistent with the individual-
ist paradigm.
"Good faith"-the turning point in Alyeska-is widely
recognized as being required in all contracts."6  Good faith,
like promissory estoppel and unconscionability, is part of the
"antimatter"" of classical contract." 8  The good faith con-
cept (whether within a contract or outside of it) reflects notions
of community and social value that the individualist paradigm
114. Grant Gilmore's idealized version of this battle appears in GILMORE,
supra note 14, at 55-66 (describing the argument over the theory of contract
between Holmes/Williston and Cardozo/Corbin).
115. The Legal Realists first made these points in the 1930s; Karl Llewellyn
attempted to dismantle the rigid paradigm in the Uniform Commercial Code
because it was unsuited to modern commercial transactions. At the policy-
projecting level, contractarian analysis suffers from problems similar to those
that limited the law of sales before Llewellyn reconceptualized it.
116. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981).
117. Cf GILMORE, supra note 14, at 61.
118. I would include in the "antimatter" category the many concepts within
contract law, partly based on equitable notions, that limit a promisor's "rights"
in the absence of explicit agreement. The debate between Judges Cardozo and
McLaughlin about "substantial performance" in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129
N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921), is a classic illustration of the "antimatter" and "matter"
we find throughout modern contract law.
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does not readily capture. And while imposing a duty of "good
faith" that extends to a third party differs from imposing it with
respect to one's contracting partner,"9 Alyeska is much less
remarkable when viewed in the context of all of modern contract
law, not simply its individualistic elements.
'"Wrongful act" reformulations also implicitly reject another
aspect of community, the importance of the relationship between
the plaintiff and the other party. What arguably distinguishes
this tort from other bases for liability is a preexisting relation-
ship between the plaintiff and her original promisor which is
disrupted by the defendant. 2 ° In rejecting the relationship as
a relevant factor, the "wrongful act" critics have eliminated an
arguably core element of the tort and downplayed or denied the
value of the continuing relationship (beyond its contract
damages value)'2' both to the plaintiff and to society. In Part
III, I suggest that the tort's case law development reflects (as
does the Restatement's formulation) a recognition of the impor-
tance and value of preserving ongoing relationships and that we
would do better as a policy matter to recognize, value, and
nurture ongoing relationships than to deny their importance.
119. Among other things, the perennial tort problem of deciding to whom a
duty of "good faith" runs is absent in the two-party setting.
120. We can, of course, view the loss of the relationship as simply the
quantum of damages for the defendant's wrongful act. See Dobbs, supra note
43, at 365 (stating that the most obvibus case for imposing liability for
interference is the case where the defendant commits acts which constitute a
tort so that the interference becomes one item of damages, but not itself ground
for action). That the tort has made the existence of a relationship an element
of the claim itself is, I believe, a reflection of community values.
121. As developed below, a central postulate of many critics is that contract
damages will make the injured plaintiff "whole," and therefore there is no need
to assess tort damages against the outsider. As most with business experience
will recognize, this assumption is sufficiently unrealistic as to be false. Cf
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1887, 1893
n.16 (1994) (asserting that economists derive conclusions based on unrealistic
assumptions, and then attempt to transfer those conclusions from the world in
which the model operates to the world in which we live). But see Wexler, supra
note 6, at 279 ("Except for litigation expenses, ABC is as satisfied [with
expectation damages] as it would be if X fully performed its obligations under
the contract."). But as I argue below, even if we could make contract damages
far more accurate in delivering "full compensation," there would remain policy
reasons to condemn through the tort system defendants who disrupt ongoing
relationships.
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B. FORMAL CONTRACT LAW CRITIQUES: ELEVATING IDEALIZED
CONTRACT DOCTRINE
A second line of criticism assaults the tort because courts
find liability in some situations where contract law would not
provide a remedy. This criticism puts formal contract law at the
center of the analysis for purposes of corralling tort liability.
As discussed earlier, many cases extend protection to at-will
and to unenforceable contracts, and some courts have affixed
liability where there is no contract at all. The logical critique is
that if the plaintiff's interest is not enforceable as a contract
right against the promisor, then it should not form the foun-
dation for the tort of interference with contract. 122  This ap-
proach obviously elevates the legal status of the relationship as
a relevant criterion of liability by drawing a sharp line between
relationships that have crystallized into "enforceable contracts"
and those that have not.
This criticism refuses to credit the value courts have
recognized in relationships that have not crystallized into
contracts. By putting contract law in the center, the critiques
elevate an individualist perspective" over one that may be
more reflective of community. That contract law should
dominate or preempt tort law is surely not self-evident.
124
122. Thus, recent commentators advocate limiting the tort to contracts that
are not terminable at will, see Grothe, supra note 75, at 461 (arguing that a
beginning point to analyze a tortious interference claim is determining whether
an interest which should be protected exists); Gary Myers, The Differing
Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference
Law, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1097, 1141 (1993) (claiming that tortious interference
law should permit a competitor to interfere with at-will and avoidable contracts,
unless the competitor employs means that are otherwise unlawful), and to
contracts that are enforceable under contract law. Danforth, supra note 79, at
1515-17 (claiming that interference with prospective contracts does not threaten
a societal interest in the formal integrity of contract, and should not be treated
as a mere variant of interference with existing contracts); see also, Sales, supra
note 6, at 148-49; cf Perlman, supra note 6, at 91.
123. The "contract law" that the critics envision is, I believe, the individual-
ist, supposedly predictable part contained in classical contract law, not the fuzzy
amalgam that is modern contract.
124. Some might assert that, because contract law simply enforces voluntary
agreements between and among individuals, it is value neutral and therefore
should be preferred to tort law, which rests on public policy formulated by
judges. I would urge, on the contrary, that contract law generally, and certainly
classical contract law and critiques that use its individualist methodology,
reflect individualist policies that are as value-loaded as any others. See
generally Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
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One reason for restricting the tort to enforceable contracts
is the apparent belief'25 that contract rules are more easily
determined in advance and more easily administered in liti-
gation.2 ' This reflects an idealized version of classical contract
law embodied by offer, acceptance, consideration, and a readily
determinable "moment" of contract formation. This ideal and
the reality of business are often quite distant.'
History's biggest interference-with-contract case was Texaco,
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,12 and at its center was a legal question
right out of a first-year contracts course. Texaco interrupted the
developing Pennzoil-Getty relationship before "the contract" was
formally closed; applicable New York law required a valid,
enforceable contract between Getty and Pennzoil for interference
liability.12 9 That pivotal prerequisite of New York tort liabili-
ty-whether "a contract" had formed in the context of this
complex negotiation (a contract, not a tort law, question)-went
to a Texas jury. In this context one would need a fortune teller to
reliably forecast the decision on contract formation by an unknown
jury in an unknown jurisdiction months or years in advance. In
this typical context, the predictive utility of contract law could be
less than tort's more general standard of "wrongfulness.""0
YALE L.J. 997 (1985).
125. Reasons for restricting the tort to "enforceable contracts" vary. As I will
discuss below, some analysts believe that economic efficiency should circum-
scribe the tort and that efficiency demands that the tort not apply to most cases
outside the enforceable contract realm. See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 6, at 91.
Professor Epstein believes that "contract" is a species of "property," which the
tort exists to protect. If there is no contract, there is no "property," and
therefore there should be no tort. Epstein, supra note 4, at 24; see also supra
note 72 and accompanying text.
126. One expression is that "[t]he more stable, predictable and principled
remedies of contract, rather than the unprincipled and unpredictable doctrine
of tort, should furnish the basis for defining the parameters of liability." Sales,
supra note 6, at 148-49.
127. Neoclassical contract doctrine, with its vision of an instant of contract
formation, does not work well in the context of an evolving relationship where
the parties have left the legal status of their relationship with one another
ambiguous. This is one of the points made by Ian Macneil and others looking
for a reconceptualization of contract law. Arguably, the tort cases recognizing
liability for interrupting relationships that are not "contracts" reflect the fact
that relationships develop; they do not burst into existence with the big bang
of offer and acceptance.
128. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
129. Id. at 788.
130. If the question that the lawyers focused on was "Would it be (or was it)
wrong for Texaco to break up the emerging business relationship between
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A second reason given for restricting the tort to fixed-term
contracts is that business competition will be adversely affected
if we do not.' 3 ' This reason is most easily seen as a corollary
to the more basic proposition that the tort threatens "legitimate"
business activity in all cases and requires scaling back across the
board. We turn now to this "core" criticism.
C. CORE CRITICISM OF THE INTERFERENCE TORT
Vagueness in the standard for liability has prompted some
commentators to reformulate the liability question in terms of
the defendant's "wrongful" conduct. But this reformulation
creates a serious difficulty. Once one accounts for the "bad
conduct" cases (however defined), there remain cases such as
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. or even Lumley v. Oye where all the
defendant has done is knowingly interfered with another's
preexisting contract. Under the Restatement formulation,
supported by nearly a century and a half of case law, it is
"wrongful," without more,'32 to interfere with a contract involv-
ing others.'33 These are "core" cases not explained by any tort
or contract principle other than interference with contract.
Provocative accounts have come from critics who have chal-
lenged these core interference situations, where the case for
conduct-based liability is far less evident than in others.
1. The Law-and-Economics Critique
The core criticism comes primarily from an economic policy
perspective on contract law. The economic criticism asserts that
the tort of interference with contract conflicts in core cases with
economic efficiency' 3 -specifically, with the theory of "efficient
Pennzoil and Getty for its own profit?" (a tort question), the jury outcome might
well have been more predictable than was its answer to the question, "Was a
contract formed between Getty and Pennzoil at the time that Texaco broke up
the relationship?" Many trial lawyers would recognize that the jury's finding
of liability would actually be an answer to the first question, even though the
question being put to them was the second.
131. See Perlman, supra note 6, at 93; cf. Epstein, supra note 4, at 21-22
(arguing that allowing any action against the third party for inducing contract
termination, instead of breach, would place a major crimp in the operation of
competitive market).
132. KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 978.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
134. Professor Dobbs bases his criticism not primarily on economic freedom
but on the vagueness of the tort's contours and on the problems such vagueness
fosters. Nonetheless, he found the conflict of the tort with efficient breach
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breach"-and therefore must be either eliminated.. 5 or circum-
scribed."3 6 To appreciate the apparently fundamental chal-
lenge this tort presents to the law-and-economics theory of
efficient breach, we must briefly survey the efficient breach
theory itself.
a. Efficient Breach Theory
We could probably trace the "efficient breach" idea to the
now-famous descriptive statement by Holmes that "[t]he duty to
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you
must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else." 37
In the 1970s it was recast into normative form by Richard
Posner and others who use economic theory to fuel public
policy.' In its normative form, the idea is that if a party
bound by contract finds a second offer for her performance
favorable enough to allow her to pay her promisee damages on
the first contract and still have value left over, the law should
encourage her to breach the contract for economic efficiency's
sake. Since the original promisor and the new promisee will be
better off and the injured party will be made "whole," the
resulting economic status quo will be better than what preceded
it. 1
39
theory a reason to restrict the tort. See Dobbs, supra note 43, at 360-63.
135. See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 6, at 128-29 (suggesting interference tort
should not be applied to otherwise lawful acts).
136. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 4, at 924-36 (arguing inducement tort
should be refined); Epstein, supra note 4, at 21-24 (positing inducement tort
only be applied to actionable breach of contract).
137. Holmes, supra note 67, at 462. Holmes was not the first to advance this
proposition; it appears as early as the seventeenth century. In Bromage v.
Gennings, 1 Rolle 368 (1617), Lord Coke complained about chancery courts
awarding specific performance in contract cases. According to Holdsworth, Coke
"contended that a decree for specific performance was always unjust to the
defendant because 'it deprived him of his election either to pay damages or to
fulfil his promise.'" I WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 461
(7th ed. 1956) (quoting Bromage).
138. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 4.8 (4th ed. 1992);
see also John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract,
1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972) (suggesting damages should be assessed in
accordance with economic efficiency); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of
Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273,
281-86 (1970) (arguing the law should encourage economically efficient
behavior).
139. Richard Posner distinguishes between Pareto superiority (no one is
worse off and at least one person is better off) and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion
(someone is better off by more than others are worse off). The difference is that
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As a common example, suppose Buyer and Seller have a
contract to exchange grain at a price of $90 in one month's time.
At performance time, suppose the grain is worth $100 on the
market, but, in the meantime, Seller has found another buyer
who will pay $110 for the grain.4 ° If Seller substitutes the
second buyer for the first, it can pay the first buyer $10 in
expectation damages and still be ahead by $10. In a now-famous
passage, Judge (then Professor) Posner supported expectation
damages in this context by stating "if damages are limited to the
loss of that profit, there will be an incentive to commit a breach.
But there should be."'
A central objective of the efficient breach analysis is that of
moving resources to their highest value. Consequently, in the
example above, it is supposedly "efficient" for the second buyer
to get the grain because she values it more than the first buyer.
If the first buyer ends up as well off following the breach and the
breacher is better off having breached and resold, we have net
economic gain. Because the pie has grown larger through this
second transaction, Posner argues we ought to encourage it. The
encouragement comes from instrumental policy makers who
should fine-tune the contract damages system to provide the
actor-here the promisor-with optimal incentives to be efficient.
Contract damages, in this view, function primarily as a
disincentive for the promisor rather than as compensation for
the promisee.
The efficient breach analysis offers one explanation of
expectation damages4 . and has prompted much criticism in
Pareto superiority would require the winners actually to compensate the losers,
whereas Kaldor-Hicks does not. "The Kaldor-Hicks concept is also and
suggestively called potential Pareto superiority: The winners could compensate
the losers, whether or not they actually do." POSNER, supra note 138, at 14.
140. See, e.g., id. at 119 (working through a similar example). As Professor
Macneil points out, the example is internally inconsistent because it assumes
perfect information and perfect markets, and these assumptions conflict with
a postulated buyer who will buy at a higher than market price. Ian R. Macneil,
Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 950-51
(1982).
141. POSNER, supra note 138, at 119.
142. See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL
J. ECON. 466, 472-87 (1980) (rigorously examining damage alternatives in
contract system and positing expectation damages are most efficient); see also
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 53-57 (offering a different explanation for
expectation damages). But see Robert Birmingham, Notes on the Reliance
Interest, 60 WASH. L. REv. 217, 220-45 (1985) (detailing the lack of sophisti-
cation in Fuller and Perdue's approach).
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the literature. 43 In some quarters, the efficient breach idea is
treated as an axiom in the broadside challenges to the tort of
interference with contract: because the case law conflicts with
efficient breach analysis, the case law must be in error.'"
b. Theory Versus Case Law
Commentators who take efficient breach as their benchmark
urge that core interference holdings conflict with efficiency goals
and therefore generate undesirable outcomes. Generally, they
argue that tort liability in this context distorts the otherwise
optimal incentives contract damages give to contracting parties,
causing them to act more inefficiently than they would without
the tort. The critics diverge, however, when they specify how
the tort operates on actors' incentive systems and, therefore,
what should be done. This split among critics is not unusual
and underscores a major weakness in the contractarian enter-
prise.
The more obvious efficient breach assault maintains that the
interference tort discourages otherwise efficient breaches. 45
In this analysis, the prospect of tort liability distorts the third
party's decision by creating a disincentive to bring better offers
to the already committed promisor. Hence, the tort will block
many lucrative deals that the promisor should substitute for her
present commitment. According to this view, the tort is bad
because it inefficiently discourages the economically optimum
number of breaches. 46 Put another way, there will not be
143. See, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEG.
STUD. 1, 18-23 (1989); Linzer, supra note 7, at 131-38; see also Macneil, supra
note 140, at 950-54 . One critique that comes from the law-and-economics
literature itself is that the efficient breach theory conflicts with the Coase
Theorem, which asserts that in the absence of transaction costs, efficient
outcomes will result no matter what rules are used. ROBERT ScoTT & DOUGLAS
LEsLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 90-95 (2d ed. 1993). Macneil made the
powerful point early in the debate that the "breach first, talk later" regime of
efficient breach may well carry far higher transaction costs than, for example,
a regime of specific performance, which would require talking first. Macneil,
supra note 140, at 154-60.
144. See Grothe, supra note ?, at 467-74; Perlman, supra note 6, at 128-29.
145. See Perlman, supra note 6, at 82-87.
146. Of course, in this context the tort directly deters only the third party,
not the promisor, and only when the third party "induces" or "procures" the
breach. See International Union United Auto., Aircraft and Agric. Implement
Workers of Am. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 639 (1958) (acknowledging inducement
by threat); Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 112 P.2d 631, 632 (Cal. 1941) (recogniz-
ing that an action will lie for inducing breach of contract by resorting to means
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enough breaches; too many contracting parties will stay
together.
A little less obvious but equally logical is the opposite
critique: the tort is inefficient because it encourages too many
breaches.47 Here, the argument runs, the prospect of tort
liability alters the incentives operating on the original promisor.
By adding another potential defendant if the contract falls apart,
the tort causes the original promisor to surmise she might
breach without paying any damages. This reduces her incen-
tives not to breach, even where it is "inefficient" to do so. This
view condemns the tort on efficiency grounds because there will
be an inefficiently high number of breaches; too few contracting
parties will stay together.
No one has performed the empirical study that would tell us
what, if anything,4 ' the existence of the interference tort
in themselves unlawful); Allen v. Powell, 56 Cal. Rptr. 715, 718 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967) (noting that defendant must actively induce breach); Wolf v. Perry, 339
P.2d 679, 681 (N.M. 1959) (ruling that a third party will only be liable if she
has knowledge of the breached contract); BeVier, supra note 4, at 926-36;
Epstein, supra note 4, at 21-24.
Even if the committed promisor seeks out the third party, the prospect of
tort liability probably will affect the negotiation. Any third party aware of the
billion-dollar punitive damage award in Texaco will be circumspect about
dealing with the promisor, who may have already committed its resources
elsewhere by contract. See, e.g., Peter Waldman, Cautious Talks: Texaco-
Pennzoil Case Makes Firms Careful About Merger Moves, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15,
1986, at A3 (describing reaction in the business community to Texaco); cf
Perlman, supra note 6, at 78-79 (arguing third party should not be held liable
if actions are otherwise lawful). If the parties ultimately reach agreement
despite the possibility of tort liability, that risk will, theoretically, be reflected
in the deal's pricing.
147. See Dowling, supra note 6, at 488.
148. It is unclear as an empirical matter whether the interference tort
prompts anybody to do much of anything. Empirical studies suggest that the
law has but marginal influence on the business behavior of business people and
that other factors such as loss of business reputation are far more important.
See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) (pioneering the argument). In
the bankruptcy area, empirical work has suggested that the law is not nearly
as influential on the behavior of those subject to it as legal academics might
wish. See generally THERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS
(1989) (discussing incentive in American bankruptcy law); Jean Braucher,
Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR.
L J. 501 (1993) (discussing different responses to bankruptcy law); Lynn M.
LoPucki, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization
of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 267 (1994) (comparing
bankruptcy law in the United States to bankruptcy law in Canada).
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motivates contracting parties to do. 49 One way or another,
however, the critics urge that the tort produces inefficient
results and therefore should yield to the efficient breach theory.
c. Case Law Versus Theory
Whatever the "correct" forecast for an actor's reaction to
third-party tort liability, these "core" critics use the efficient
breach theory as their point of departure. A different way to
consider the conflict between the interference-with-contract case
law and the efficient breach theory is to take the case law as a
starting point and examine the efficient breach theory in light of
it. If we start with the cases, a corresponding "core" attack
would maintain that the existence of a long line of interference-
with-contract cases "proves" that efficient breach theory is
simply wrong. 50 A more modest critique suggests the efficient
breach theory is correct in theory but wrong as commentators
apply it. This section will focus briefly on the problems implicit
in the efficient breach theory, and then consider the theory itself
in light of the interference tort.
In the efficient breach theory, damages payable under the
contract system are central because they are thought to supply
the promisor with the correct incentives in deciding whether to
breach. In measuring the costs and benefits of the new offer, the
breacher is said to require an incentive that will cause him to
breach whenever he can make the promisee as well off and
himself or the new buyer better off. In the simple example
above, it was "efficient" for the promisor to breach and sell grain
149. As the split among these critics illustrates, the Achilles' heel in
incentive-based analysis is the need for the critic to forecast people's behavioral
response to changes in the law. The predictive dichotomy described in the text
underscores that incentive-based criticism ultimately and critically rests on the
experience of the commentator rather than something less subjective.
Do law professors have the training, experience, or wisdom to make
predictions about human behavior? How does our aptitude for this critical job
compare with that of lawyers, of judges, or of politicians? As if to underscore
the point, Mr. Dowling, a lawyer, predicted a different dynamic than did the
academics. Academic freedom may permit academics to be unbiased, but our
academic insulation and our tendency to eschew empirical studies may seriously
undermine our ability to predict actual human behavior.
Others have advanced comparable observations. Robin West powerfully
made a similar point about economic rationality in her critical review ofRichard
Posner's application of economic analysis to sexual behavior. Robin West, Sex,
Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413, 2414-18 (1993).
150. Cf Friedmann, supra note 143, at 20.
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to the second buyer because the second buyer valued it more
than the first and, following the payment of expectation
damages, the first buyer suffered no loss. If the first buyer is
made as well off following the breach, and the breacher (at least)
is better off having breached and resold, we have economic
gain. 5' The law, it is said, should encourage individuals
within the legal system to create economic gain.52
An obviously critical ingredient to the efficiency at the heart
of the efficient breach theory is the premise that the remedy for
breach of contract offers a complete substitute for the promisor's
full performance. For unless the promisee is "indifferent" to the
breach, 5 ' we cannot say for sure that the situation after the
breach is economically better than it was before. Thus, if
efficient breach theory conflicts with the interference-with-
contract case law, the contract remedies system may be the
reason.
Many have observed that expectation damages, at least as
they are administered by our courts, do not make the plaintiff as
well off as full performance would have.5 Even if the promi-
sor were to pay damages voluntarily,'55 the promisee would
probably expend time and energy to get the money.156  And
courts almost always 57 exclude from the realm of compensable
contract damages the value of the promisee's disappointment,
annoyance, even actual emotional distress. 55 Beyond denying
151. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (illustrating the efficient
breach argument).
152. See POSNER, supra note 138, at 119.
153. This is an implication of the Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Principle,
"which posits that a benefit to one individual, even if it carries with it a loss to
another, increases society's welfare so long as the benefited party is able to fully
compensate the losing party and to remain better off than before." Linzer, supra
note 7, at 114 (emphasis added).
154. See supra note 143 (citing critics of efficient breach analysis).
155. If someone has breached, it means that the promisee has not agreed to
nonperformance. Under those circumstances, it seems unlikely as an empirical
matter that the promisor will pay full expectation damages voluntarily.
156. To maintain that these items are de minimis and therefore to be
assumed away is inconsistent with a major premise underlying much economic
analysis, that individuals choose for themselves what they value and how much
it is worth.
157. See Douglas J. Whaley, Paying for the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional
Distress Damages in Contract Action, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935, 951 (1992).
158. It is doubtful that a court would consider expenses, beyond attorneys'
fees, incurred while attempting to collect damages from the promisor to be
"incidental damages" under the Uniform Commercial Code (§ 2-715). The
American rule suggests that the promisee may not collect attorney's fees, but
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these losses which probably accompany most breaches,'59
courts, following Hadley v. Baxendale, have limited consequen-
tial damages resulting from a breach. 6 ' In addition, the
demands of proof within the litigation context will limit some of
the plaintiff's damages even though the plaintiff may have
suffered them.'6' In short, in our system of expectation dam-
there are many exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914) (ordering
courts to include attorney's fees in antitrust damage calculations); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2060, 2072, 2073 (1972) (awarding attorney's fees to prevailing parties in
consumer protection litigation); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (allowing courts to
award attorney's fees to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation).
One author has reported that some 2200 state and federal statutes shift
attorneys' fees. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation:
The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1588 (1993).
Professors Calamari and Perillo note that including such terms in form
contracts is a "common practice." JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-35, at 569 (3d ed. 1987). Indeed, provisions
requiring consumers to pay lenders, landlords, and other consumer creditors
their attorneys' fees for collection seem ubiquitous. Compare Kenneth G.
Charron, Distress Writ: A Nonresidential Landlord's Best Tool, 67 FLA. B.J. 60,
60-61 (1993) (describing provisions that help landlords collect) with Fred H.
Miller, Consumer Issues and the Revision of U.C.C. Article, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1565, 1576 n.40 (1994) (describing legislation which protects consumers).
159. Beginning with the inadequacy of contract damages, some have urged
wider enforcement of "penalty" clauses. They observe that Hadley and similar
restrictions on damages motivate promisors to set their remedies by agreement,
which will reflect the "real" damages the parties envision from a breach of the
contract. Cf Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties
and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and
a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 556-58 (1977) (describing
the operation of penalty provisions). From a different perspective, Professor
Alan Schwartz suggests wider enforcement of liquidated damages clauses by
using economic analysis to show that contracting parties do not prefer
supracompensatory remedies. Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer
SupracompensatoryRemedies:AnAnalysis of ContractingforDamage Measures,
100 YALE L.J. 369, 395-403 (1990).
160. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); see also
Carpel v. Saget Studios, 326 F. Supp. 1331, 1333-34 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (limiting
the scope of damages for breach of contract); Jankowski v. Mazzotta, 152
N.W.2d 49, 51 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (denying recovery for mental anguish
caused by breach of contract).
161. See, e.g., Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble, 153 U.S. 540,549 (1894) (limiting
breach of contract damages to reasonably certain profits); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Hall, 124 U.S. 444, 456-58 (1888) (limiting breach damages to actual
losses); Fireside Marshmallow Co. v. Frank Quinlan Const. Co., 213 F.2d 16, 18-
19 (8th Cir. 1952) (ruling that breach damages should not include speculative
expected profits); Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 943 (Colo. 1985)
(refusing to award damages based on mere speculation or conjecture); Swartz
v. Steele, 325 N.E.2d 910, 913-14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (ruling that damages
must be shown with certainty).
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ages, the plaintiff will never be 162 as well off following the
breach as she would have been with full performance. 6 '
Overlapping and exacerbating the restrictions the contract
system places on recovery of damages, the inevitability of
transaction costs is another problem that undermines the
efficient breach idea. If we count reimbursement of the
promisee's attorneys' fees and related expenses of collection from
an involuntary defendant as necessary to make her truly
"indifferent" to the breach, the efficient breach theory runs into
problems on its own terms. In a slightly different context,
Arthur Leff suggested in the early 1970s that the promisee's
legal expenses (which the promisee must bear in our system)
would logically guarantee that the promisee would not be made
whole following the breach."M Leff suggested that in a world
of rational maximizers, a debtor would never pay a debt volun-
tarily. For in such a hypothetical world devoid of considerations
of reputation or long-term business prospects, the breacher could
force the plaintiff to spend money to collect the debt, and thus
the parties would settle the claim for something less than the
amount owed. In the context of efficient breach, this would
mean the parties would settle the claim for something less than
the already inadequate expectation damages. Proponents have
not refined the efficient breach paradigm to require the
breacher, at the time of the breach, to visit the promisee and
hand over expectation damages-in cash.
162. While "full compensation" is not impossible under the contract remedies
system, the odds in any real case are so remote that the statement in the text
can safely be treated as a working assumption.
163. A regime of specific performance would probably solve many of our
contract remedies problems. See Linzer, supra note 7, 131-38 (advocating
specific performance as breach of contract remedy); Schwartz, The Case for
Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 278-96 (1979) (arguing specific
performance is the best remedy for breach of contract). Indeed, specific
performance is arguably more "efficient" than substitutional relief, see Macneil,
supra note 140, at 154-60, but such a regime is inconsistent with the efficient
breach hypothesis itself. Efficient breach seeks to give the promisor the
unilateral freedom to choose a new deal over the current one; specific
performance would bar that and force negotiation with the promisee. As many
have suggested, absent transaction costs, the product would get to the person
who valued it most under either rule. See SCOTT & LESLIE, supra note 143, at
94 (noting that both specific performance and efficient breach lend themselves
to allocative efficiency); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (suggesting that products naturally tend to be allocated to
those who value them most).
164. Arthur Leff, Injury, Ignorance, and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive
Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1970).
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No doubt in reaction to this unreal world devoid of trans-
action costs, and a developing understanding that transaction
costs might be all that is important, 165 writers have more
recently begun to focus directly on transaction costs of various
solutions to legal problems. 66  In this context, Ian
Macneil, 67  and more recently Daniel Friedmann, 6 1 have
contended that transaction costs and the ripple effects of the
breach are what really matter in an efficiency analysis and that
a regime of breach-first probably produces higher transaction
costs than does a regime of talk-first or renegotiate-first. Both
have suggested that, in efficiency terms, a regime of specific
performance-that is, no nonperformance without the promisee's
permission-might be better because of lowered transaction costs.
69
165. Ronald Coase first advanced the proposition that with perfect
information and perfect markets, the legal rule does not matter; the parties will
bargain to an efficient result under any rule. Coase, supra note 163, at 15.
From this proposition, it follows that lowering transaction costs is central to
improving the efficiency of legal rules. See SCOTT & LESLIE, supra note 143, at
90-95 (demonstrating ways a party to a contract can negotiate around legal
remedies and the most appropriate breach of contract rules).
166. See, e.g., Victor Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts,
1985 WIS. L. REV. 527, 541 (discussing various costs associated with price
adjustment dispute resolution); Masten, supra note 13 (applying transaction-
cost reasoning to institutional design questions); Thomas Palay, 59 Relational
Contracting, Transaction Cost Economics and the Governance of HMO's, TEMP.
L.Q. 927, 949 (1986) (applying transaction cost theory to the process of private
lawmaking); Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance
of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 234 (1979) (emphasizing the
importance of transaction costs to the organization of economic activity).
167. Macneil, supra note 140, at 953.
168. Friedmann, supra note 143, at 6-7.
169. There seem to be two "transaction costs" schools. One follows Oliver
Williamson, see authorities cited supra note 166, and focuses on methods of
reducing distrust within relationships in order to reduce friction and therefore
transaction costs. An excellent example of this is Palay, supra note 166
(studying contractual dispute resolution mechanisms within health maintenance
organizations).
Very different from the "reduce distrust" approach is a "rational bargaining
model" advanced by Professors Goetz, Scott, Leslie, and others. This model,
adopting a technique long used by political philosophers, projects policy
decisions from the choices that hypothetical, rational bargainers would make
under various circumstances. Such a model is directly concerned with the
transaction costs of bargaining and seeks to reduce them by supplying "default
rules" that the hypothetical parties would select under given circumstances.
These commentators suggest that we have a regime of expectation damages
(and other contract rules) because rational contracting parties would write such
rules into their deals if we didn't have them. See SCOTT & LESLIE, supra note
143, at 94-95; BeVier, supra note 4, at 920-28 (using this analysis to support
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To these points, one might add that efficient breach theory
takes no account of the impact of a breach on third parties, and
to be internally consistent, it should. The idea at the bottom of
the efficient breach theory is the Kaldor-Hicks Compensation
Principle, that is, the world has become a better place because
someone is better off by more than others are worse off.7 °
Efficient breach, however, focuses only on the two parties to the
contract and not on others who might be adversely affected by
a breach. 7' With many contracts, there are third parties who
may lose if a contract is breached but who will have no redress
through the legal system.'72 If, for example, the contract is
interference with contract in limited circumstances).
So appealing is this form of individualist contract analysis that it has
spawned an entire literature of its own and even its own initials ("DRA" for
"Default Rules Analysis"). See Feinman, supra note 11, at 48-54 (reviewing the
body of scholarship on DRA). See generally Symposium, Default Rules and
Contractual Consent, 3 S.C. INTERDIsc. L.J. 1-444 (1993). As a methodology, it
suffers from many of the same weaknesses as its older sibling, efficient breach
theory, particularly the central weakness of basing policy on law-professor
predictions of human response to legal changes. See supra note 149 (addressing
the need to predict behavioral responses to changes in the law).
170. Linzer, supra note 7, at 114 n.12 (quoting Nichlas Kaldor's principle);
see also supra note 139 (comparing the Kaldor-Hicks concept to pareto
superiority).
171. The "rational bargaining model," supra note 169, also typically limits
its focus to the parties to the transaction and others that will be similarly
situated. For a contemporary example of the two-party focus within the
literature, see generally Schwartz, supra note 159 (focusing only on
promisor/promisee bargaining).
172. This is, of course, the logical implication of the notion of strict privity.
Probably the most substantial leap in recognizing third parties affected by
others' contracts came in 1859 when the New York Court of Appeals enshrined
the third-party beneficiary rule in Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). Third-
party beneficiary law usually centers on identifying which third parties ought
to have rights under others' contracts. See generally Anthony Jon Waters, The
Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1111 (1985).
An analogous situation involving no contract but, instead, a longstanding,
economically important set of relationships is the shut-down or relocation of a
large business with which the local economy has become interdependent. The
adverse reaction of many citizens to such decisions is grounded in the third-
party effects the "private" decision has on the local economy. The plant
relocation decision will take account of the costs and benefits to the firm,
including transaction costs of the firm's move and the gains that will result
from the move. There will be, however, little accounting for the actual costs
borne by employees when they lose their jobs and have to seek others, perhaps
through geographical relocation. And while adverse consequences of the move
on the "old" community might be offset by positive growth in the "new"
community, neither these effects nor the actual costs of the transition from "old"
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one to supply a manufacturer with raw materials, and breach
causes layoffs of the manufacturer's at-will employees, the
employees will suffer losses that they are unlikely to recover
through the contract system. 7 ' Yet unless we can say the
total gains from the breach exceed the total losses, we cannot say
anything one way or the other about the efficiency of this
breach. 74
Together, these observations make a convincing case that,
given the damages and litigation systems we have, the essential
premise for the efficient breach theory fails: our costly litigation
and damage systems ensure that expectation damages will not
make the promisee as well off as performance would have and
will limit the extent to which we can compensate all who might,
in fact, lose by a breach of contract.
d. Reconciliation
One way to reconcile the efficient breach theory with the
tort cases is to take the interference-with-contract case law as a
given and assume that the common law is using it to insert into
the legal system the incentives to make efficient breach
work. ' The tort, in this view, augments contract remedies
to "new" will figure in the calculated costs and benefits of the business's
decision to move.
Our political system has obviously recognized these concerns in decisions
about military base closings, and the courts have been pressed to recognize
them in some instances. For example, when United States Steel closed its
Youngstown, Ohio operation, its workers were obviously affected. They
managed, at least temporarily, to force the company to consider their interests.
See generally Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 614 (1988) (discussing the obligations the company owed the employees
upon closing the plant).
173. A successful employee claim that she was a third-party beneficiary of
an ordinary supply contract is unlikely. A court would probably hold that she
was not an "intended beneficiary" of the contract. Cf In re Fairchild Indus.,
Inc. & GMF Invs., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1528, 1534 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (finding that
to be a third-party beneficiary, contracting parties must intend to confer benefit
and benefit must be a material part of the contract); Martinez v. Socoma Cos.,
Inc., 521 P.2d 841, 845 (Cal. 1974) (holding that third-party beneficiaries were
not entitled to remedies because they were only incidental).
174. See infra text accompanying note 256 (demonstrating the uncompen-
sated losses third-parties may suffer when a contract is broken).
175. This is the apparent approach often taken by Richard Posner, who
frequently finds that the law, whatever it may be, is efficient. See generally
Jack Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87
CoLuM. L. REV. 1447 (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POSNER,
THE EcoNoMIc STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)); Arthur A. Leff, Economic
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that, by themselves, do not supply the "correct" incentives to
govern the breach decision.'76 But this explanation fails to
satisfy. First, this tort-fix to the contract-remedies system
operates very partially and sporadically. Second, why should the
law modify incentives in such an extremely indirect way? 77
i. Partial Reconciliation
Professor Lillian BeVier articulated most directly the
fundamental conflict between the tort and efficient breach
theory: "Can efficient breach theory accommodate the induce-
ment tort or is there an irreducible inconsistency?"'78 She and
other critics have reconciled the tort with the efficient breach
theory in those situations where they believe it supplements
deficiencies in contract remedies. 7 9 In so doing, they have
focused on a group of interference cases most pertinent for
discussing efficient breach theory: those in which the third party
induces a breach in order to get the performance for herself.80
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
In fact, writing before the efficient breach critics of this tort arrived on the
scene, Judge Posner explained why the tort of interference with contract was
efficient, notwithstanding the efficient breach theory. Richard A. Posner &
William M. Landes, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 517, 553-54; see also supra note 149 (questioning the academic's
ability to predict human behavior).
176. In addition, by reducing the number of temptations to breach a fixed
contract, the tort may reduce the need to deploy an inadequate damages system
in the first place and thereby reduce the incidence of loss to all losers.
177. If an actor within the legal system (a judge, for example) consciously
wanted to affect the incentives operating on the promisor's decision to breach,
why would she take the roundabout and partial route of applying a tort
incentive to a third party instead of to the promisor? If we wanted to increase
a promisor's incentives not to breach, it would be considerably more direct and
coherent simply to require the promisor to pay more if she breaches a contract.
Relaxing some of the restrictions on contract damages or permitting punitive
damages in some contract cases are two direct ways to alter the promisor's
incentives concerning breach.
The law-and-economics literature uses incentive analysis to concoct many
other strange and indirect explanations of various phenomena. Certainly more
extreme than an efficient breach explanation of the interference tort is Richard
Posner's use of incentive analysis to explain sexual behavior. See generally
West, supra note 149 (reviewing Posner's explanation of consensual sexual
behavior using a cost-benefit analysis).
178. BeVier, supra note 4, at 897.
179. Id. at 887; Epstein, supra note 4, 19-26; Partlett, supra note 6, 795-806.
180. Cases exist in which the defendant induces a breach without getting the
promisor's performance, but they may be less common; the defendant's behavior
in such cases does not as obviously resemble that of the economists rational
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The particular cases on which these critics focus are, indeed,
strong cases for legal redress, whatever the theory of justifi-
cation. Situations where the inducer obtains the plaintiff's
performance contain a strong restitutionary allure-the third
party seems to have gotten for herself something that "belonged"
in some sense to the promisee.' l The facts in such cases work
upon courts to return that which was "taken" to the plain-
tiff.15 2 Lumley v. Gye 83 and many interference cases possess
this restitutionary attraction; were it not for the interference
tort, the law of restitution might well have developed a remedy
in these cases."5 4
Critics who have partially reconciled the tort with the
efficient breach theory have found a subgroup of these
restitutionary-fact cases that is consistent with the theory.
Professor BeVier, for example, argued that the tort made sense
in those situations where she found contract damages ordinarily
inadequate-cases she labeled "returns for information" and
"relational" cases."' In the former, the promisee has invested
resources into the relationship that she will not recoup through
contract damages;" 6 the "relational cases" include employ-
maximizer, and restitutionary overtones are missing. Smith v. Ford Motor Co.,
221 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. 1976) and Plessinger v. Castlemann & Haskell, 838 F.
Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1993), are cases in which the defendant did not get the
promisor's performance. One could, as in most situations, assert that economic
considerations motivated the defendants' behavior in these cases despite the
lack of a direct "payoff" for inducing the breach. But we really do not know the
prevalence of either kind of claim because the important data-claims asserted
and recognized as valid (and to what extent)-are not collected.
181. Because the case against the interferer and the case against the
contract breacher are not formally interrelated, the plaintiff could enjoin the
promisor's performance for the interferer and get damages from the interferer.
This happened in Lumley v. Gye and its contemporary, Lumley v. Wagner. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text. If the plaintiff were to sue both the
breacher and the interferer for damages, to the extent the damages claimed
were for the same injury evaluated the same way, it seems likely that the
plaintiff would get only one recovery. I have found no case in which the
collateral source rule or an equivalent has been invoked in an interference case.
182. See Fuller and Perdue, supra note 4, at 56 (discussing restitutions
power).
183. 2 El. & BI. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
184. A strong restitutionary "pull" has also been present in another classical
three-party contract area, the law of third-party beneficiaries. See Waters,
supra note 172, at 1206-08.
185. To the same effect is Professor Partlett's thrust. Partlett, supra note
6, at 795-806.
186. BeVier, supra note 4, at 899-908. These are contracts that "involve the
acquisition or production by Promisee of contract-specific information" and in
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ment, agency, and distributorship contracts."' In both kinds
of cases, she believes that the tort usefully supplies incentives to
better motivate the breach decision.'
In both classes of cases Professor BeVier defines, few would
argue that contract damages will put the promisee into a
position equivalent to fall performance.8 9 Selecting these
cases as supportable, however, leaves the efficient breach theory
in conflict with the remaining cases; 9' and it involves the
addi-tional, difficult job of sorting claims into or out of these
categories.' 9' Current tort doctrine is far less complicated.
Interference doctrine, as articulated by the Restatement,
applies to all existing contracts and does not require the
defendant to obtain for herself the performance originally
promised to the plaintiff.'92 The conventional doctrine thus
which the "yield from such a contract-specific investment is inextricably
dependent on performance of the precise contract in issue, as to which there are
accordingly no minimally acceptable substitute performances." Id. at 899.
Professor BeVier illustrates her definition with a contract to purchase
controlling shares of a company or a contract by the seller not to compete in
connection with the sale of the business. Id.
187. Id. at 908.
188. Id. at 916-26. "Mnducement liability is the default rule that most
parties would choose in returns-to-information and relational settings." Id. at
929.
189. Damage limitations, see supra text beginning at page 1143, and
inevitable transaction costs, see supra text beginning at page 1145, will limit
expectation damages for victims of breach. It is particularly easy to see that in
Professor BeVier's two classes of cases.
190. Professor BeVier maintained that "where there are market substitutes
for Promisor's performance, the prospect of inducement liability may systemati-
cally deter efficient behavior by the contracting parties and thus impede the
flow of resources to higher valuing users." BeVier, supra note 4, at 898.
191. Professor BeVier's reformulation of the problem focuses directly on the
"sorting" question, a question of transaction costs:
Because the inducement tort is overbroad, then, the inducement puzzle
must be reformulated. The question it raises is whether the systematic
costs of its actual or potential inappropriate application exceed the
systematic benefits it produces in returns-to-information and relational
settings.
Id. at 931.
192. See the seven factors outlined by § 767 of the Restatement at supra note
52. Plessinger involved age discrimination by a nonemployer. See supra note
49 (discussing the facts and issues of the case). Richette v. Solomon, 187 A.2d
910 (Pa. 1963), involved a defendant's direct contact with the plaintiff lawyer's
client. Neither case is easily viewed as one in which the defendant obtained for
itself the performance promised to the plaintiff. And if these are, instead,
"wrongful act" cases, we confront the difficulty of determining precisely why
these acts are "wrongful." Unless we limit "wrongful" to legislatively defined
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goes much further than would critics like Professor BeVier in
condemning defendants that knowingly interfere with contracts.
The Restatement doctrine would readily yield a finding of tort
liability where a defendant induced a promisor to breach a
fungible goods contract with the plaintiff and to sell to him
instead.193 It would hold the defendant liable for inducing the
promisor to breach his contract to sell grain that was worth $100
to plaintiff at a price of $90 and to sell it to defendant at $110
instead. This is the paradigmatic case where the supposedly
"efficient" response to the second buyer's offer is a breach of the
first contract.194 Tort liability on these facts is, indeed, diffi-
cult to reconcile with efficient breach theory.'95
ii. Full Reconciliation
The interference cases seem to clash with the efficient
breach theory in fungible goods cases if we assume 1) that
contract damages are about motivating promisors and do so in
fact, and 2) that the contract system delivers enough in those
cases to make the promisee "indifferent" to the breach. Passing
over the assumption that damages aim to motivate people and
in fact do so,' 96 the proposition that contract damages make a
activity, the problem of judicial discretion in sorting the cases reemerges. Of
course, since no legislature apparently defined the activities involved as
"wrongful," critics might argue that the cases were wrongly decided.
193. Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 782 F.2d 781 (8th Cir.
1986).
194. POSNER, supra note 138, at 119.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 134-144 (discussing the efficient
breach theory criticisms of the tort).
196. The proposition that contract damages are about promisor incentives
is certainly open to question. While the efficient breach theory seems dominant
today in explaining our system of expectation damages, it is by no means the
only theory. In their famous article, Fuller and Perdue advanced the
proposition (among others) that expectation damages are a surrogate for fully
compensatory reliance damages (which would include lost opportunities). Their
focus was on compensating the promisee, not motivating the promisor, and is
much more in keeping with what we think we are doing when we make an
award of damages. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 57-58 (discussing
factors to form the basis of reliance damages).
Moreover, the proposition that the chance of paying contract damages
actually induces behavior is open to question. For at least 60 years scholars
have recognized that contract law occupies but a small part of the business
landscape and that business reputation, the prospect of repeat business, and
similar considerations play at least as large a role among the incentives that
motivate business people as does contract law. Cf Karl N. Llewellyn, What
Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704,713 (1931); Stewart
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promisee "indifferent" is untrue enough to be called "false," even
in a fungible goods setting.97 The suggestion that people in
business are (or should be) "indifferent" as between performance
and breach-plus-expectation-damages would surprise many who
work in or around business. 98 Without substantial empirical
support,' 99 I will assert that in their contracting arrangements,
business promisees are simply not indifferent as between
receiving performance on the one hand and receiving no
performance plus today's expectation damages on the othei'.
Moreover, in most cases, a promisor would probably not
ordinarily breach if simply offered a better deal for the same
performance. 00
That there are not many reported interference cases in the
fungible goods setting 0 ' does not establish that contract
remedies deliver "indifference" to the promisees. In fact, the
absence of reported cases tells us nothing as an empirical matter
except that the parties did not litigate hard enough to yield a
reported decision. The absence of reported decisions does not
establish that promisees could find market substitutes, and their
Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry,
9 PRAC. LAW. 13, 14-15 (1963); Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract
Practice and Policy, 1992 WiS. L. REV. 13-45.
But whatever (if anything) contract law may mean as a force to motivate
business people, it seems clear that its remedies do not deliver sufficient relief
to meet the requirements that efficient breach theory (which assumes that
contract law is a motivator) holds for it.
197. See supra note 121.
198. Even if the market price at delivery and the contract price are the
same-and therefore there would be no market differential damages-the
promisee would still find inconvenience and dislocation in having to find an
alternative source on short notice. This is not "indifference" in an economic
sense.
199. I have found no business person who, when posed with a simple
efficient breach hypothetical, has expressed "indifference" as between
performance and damages calculated under our present system. In my
judgment, the point is so obvious as to be scarcely worth an empirical study.
Nobody would fund it.
No one who has predicated his or her analysis on efficient breach has
supported the "indifference assertion" with empirical data.
200. Cf. Weintraub, supra note 196, at 19 (surveying businesses and
suggesting that when the current contract becomes unsatisfactory with respect
to price, a party will often approach the other side for a modification).
201. Professor BeVier, who maintained that the tort doctrine was overbroad
in extending to "market substitute" cases, cited only one case finding liability
in such a situation and no case rejecting it. BeVier, supra note 4, at 933 n.193
(citing Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 782 F.2d 781 (8th Cir.
1986)).
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finding market substitutes would not, in the real world, establish
"indifference." Indeed, the absence of reported cases in the
fungible goods context could even mean that third-party liability
was so clear (given current tort doctrine) that it wasn't worth
litigating the liability issue and the parties settled or the
defendant capitulated." 2 Or the absence of reported cases on
the liability question could simply mean that litigation wasn't
worth the time and trouble when there was further business to
transact. °3
As an empirical matter, the assumption that contract
damages deliver "indifference" in any case is likely false;
certainly neither an inference from the efficient breach theory
nor the lack of cases establishes the proposition. Common
experience suggests the opposite.
If, therefore, we start with an efficient breach hypothesis
that the interference tort is augmenting a faulty contract
motivational system, then the tort may not be "overbroad"
204
but may be signaling a faulty contract motivational system in all
cases, including fungible goods cases. If contract damages and
the interference tort are best understood as parts of a system of
202. The more relevant data--claims made by promisees against third
parties and disposed of one way or another-are not available in a law library.
Cf Weintraub, supra note 196, at 3 ("published court opinions are likely to be
insufficient guides" in determining actual business litigation practice).
203. Empirical work like Professor Weintraub's calls into question the entire
enterprise of prescribing contract remedies rules without studying the actual
behavior of the persons who will be subject to the rules.
[L]itigation rarely follows a request to be relieved of contractual
commitments. When asked why suits were not more common, the vice
president of a company that produced construction materials said that
those he did business with were "good old boys" and "you just can't run
a business that way." The "materials controller" for a manufacturing
company employing 1,100 persons said that in his experience only one
suit was ever brought against a supplier, and that suit was settled
before trial. The reasons given for not suing when suppliers default
were that the firm only dealt with companies that had good repu-
tations and that the cost of cover was never enough over contract price
to justify the expense. The executive in charge of procurement of a
nationally-known manufacturer said that the company's contracts
contained "back billing" provisions under which the cost of items
accepted was increased when an order was partially canceled.
Id. at 20 n.60.
204. Professor BeVier comes to the conclusion that the tort is overbroad in
extending to fungible goods cases. With respect to "returns-to-information" and
"relational" cases, she says that rational bargainers would agree to inducement
liability because it would create "appropriate investment incentives" that
contract damages do not supply. BeVier, supra note 4, at 929.
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incentives, the natural question is, "What's wrong with the
contract damage system, and why fix it with the interference
tort?" As Dean Perlman has observed, "To the extent that
undercompensation interferes with the objectives of contract
doctrine, a reform applicable to all breaches seems a more
appropriate response."2°5
Having come this far, we will briefly consider the dissonance
between the contract remedies system and the assumption of
"indifference" that drives efficient breach theory. Doing so will
expose what an efficient breach theorist really asserts when
advocating new restraints on tort law in the name of efficiency.
2. The Limits of Logic and Empirical Assertion: Efficient
Breach and Interference-Tort Implications for Contract
Remedies
Because some critics cannot fully reconcile the efficient
breach theory with nearly 150 years of case law, they have
variously suggested limiting or eliminating the core Lumley
principle. A different way to approach reconciliation is through
the contract damages system. Because efficient breach theory is
critically dependent upon (and the clash with this tort emerges
from) the system of damages now in place, we can effect
reconciliation of the broad tort case law and efficient breach
theory by adjusting the contract damage rules to supply directly
what the tort may supply indirectly. If we hypothesize that
contract remedies should make the promisee indifferent to
breach20 6 (and that they can), and that the interference tort
signals that they do not," 7 then an obvious final step in the
efficient breach analysis is to consider how contract remedies
might be brought closer to the "full compensation" principle at
the heart of the efficient breach theory. What "reform[s]
applicable to all breaches""' could substitute for the efficiency-
adjusting work that the tort of interference with contract may
now perform?
The discussion should make apparent how much important
205. Perlman, supra note 6, at 89.
206. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (criticizing the assumption
that contract remedies play a role in motivating contracting parties' behavior).
207. Compare the implicit analysis of the critics, that the contract remedies
system should make parties indifferent to breach, that it does, and therefore,
that the tort cases are wrong.
208. Perlman, supra note 6, at 89.
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empirical information we need in order to develop an adequate
replacement for the tort's "incentive supplement." But in the
process it will also illustrate that the critics' solution-circum-
scribe or eliminate the Lumley principle-rests implicitly on the
same quantity of unknown empirical information. Thus, while
this extension of the efficient breach analysis might frame some
shortcomings in contract remedies that require attention, my
main purpose is to show the empirical underpinnings of an
efficient breach critique that advocates a reduction in tort
liability. In extending the analysis from where others more
friendly to the efficient breach theory leave off, I hope to add to
the efforts of others who have tried, unsuccessfully, to bury the
theory once and for all.2"9
a. "Uncertain" Damages: The Empirical Vacuum
Apart from the transaction costs of recovering expectation
damages from an unwilling promisor, a promisee will not be
indifferent to a breach because, in the process, she has sustained
the inconvenience, annoyance, delay, and disruption of routine
that accompany any nonconsensual breach. But a party's odds
of forecasting such damages in advance are very low, and a
finder-of-fact's chance of accurately quantifying such damages
seems very low as well. The contract system's formal limitations
on proving such damages are indeed functional: they rest on the
need for risk assessment and on limiting jury discretion.210
209. The two most direct attacks are Macneil, supra note 140, at 949-50 and
Friedmann, supra note 143, at 2-13.
210. The requirement that damages be proved with "reasonable certainty"
is often asserted to foreclose these damages within the contract system. See
generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 77, § 12.15 (discussing uncertainty as a limit
on contract damages). Many of these kinds of damage requests have met with
skeptical courts in the tort system, too. Doubts about whether the particular
plaintiff has actually suffered this kind of injury, and a more general difficulty
with converting these injuries into money damages, has prompted skepticism
about these damages across the litigation system. There may also be an
unstated empirical assumption that such injuries simply do not exist in most
cases. See, e.g., Browning v. Norton, 504 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974).
My own intuition is that most plaintiffs who are victims of either tort or
contract breach suffer these damages to some extent or another.
There are, to be sure, real problems with case-to-case fairness ifjuries have
discretion to award damages as they see fit for these kinds of injuries, and it is
difficult to articulate an analytical standard for constraining jury discretion.
But if, as an empirical matter, such damages typically accompany a violation
of rights, it is as wrong to deny them in all cases as it is to give juries discretion
to award them. A statutory provision would seem to have promise in this
1156
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But if we could develop rules that permitted such damages and
made them quantifiable at the time of contracting and at trial,
we could improve the incentive to efficient breach without the
attendant risk-assessment and proof problems.
Much of the difficulty in forecasting and quantifying such
damages stems from common-law contract's use of vague
categories (such as "emotional distress") and case-by-case
evaluation. But vague categories and case-by-case assessment
are not inevitable.2" The Uniform Commercial Code, which
governs most business contracts, demonstrates that drafters and
legislatures need not use soft-edged constructs in supplying rules
for contracting parties. Instead of requiring a writing for "large"
or "significant" contracts, for instance, the Code's current statute
of frauds specifies a $500 cutoff.212  Closer to the remedial
context.
211. A useful analogy is the differing treatment that the United States and
Great Britain give to wrongful-death actions. Our typical statutory solution to
the problem is to award the statutorily defined beneficiaries the net amount
that the deceased would have in her estate at her death. For young decedents,
this requires of the trier of fact extraordinary imagination and prescience. But
more importantly, the approach starkly introduces race and class stereotypes
into the mix. As an empirical matter, plaintiff-beneficiaries of a poor decedent
are likely to get less in a wrongful-death action than their wealthy counter-
parts. The awards probably vary as well by race. See generally Jane Goodman,
et al., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage Awards,
25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 263 (1991) (citing empirical studies). And while some
would no doubt justify the American results by recourse to probabilities, it is
surely a debatable policy question whether we should monetize the injury to
others brought about by the death of a loved one by looking at the hypothetical
estate a decedent would have accumulated at the end of her life expectancy.
Great Britain follows a completely different approach by awarding a flat,
statutory sum (less than $10,000) for wrongful death in cases where the
plaintiff was not a dependent of the decedent. Administration of Justice Act,
1982, ch. 53, § 3 (Eng.). See generally P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alterna-
tives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002 (discussing
distinctions between the British and American tort systems). The English
approach solves both the uncertainty and the bias problems of the American
method. And if damages for wrongful death are (or should really be) about
psychic loss and emotional distress, a flat sum is recognition that they are
unquantifiable, yet real.
212. U.C.C. § 2-201. Using a cutoff amount within the statute of frauds
dates at least to the seventeenth century: the 1677 statute's sale-of-goods
provision contained a £10 minimum. See 29 Car. II. c.3, 8 Stat. at Large 405,
quoted in Caroline N. Bruckel, The Weed and the Web: Section 2-201's
Corruption of the U.C.C.'s Substantive Provisions-The Quantity Problem, 1983
U. ILL. L. REv. 811, 842 (discussing the policy and purpose of the UCC's statute
of frauds).
At this writing, a draft revision of U.C.C. § 2-201 would abolish the statute
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situation here is the Code section permitting a seller to retain
$500 (or ten percent of the contract6 price) from a defaulting
buyer's down payment, 213 a provision fixing damages that does
not require elaborate prediction at the time of contracting or
evidentiary assessment later at trial.214 Federal statutes often
establish statutory damages for situations where we might
expect harm but find it difficult to quantify. Such damages are,
no doubt, "off' most of the time; but if the interference tort is, in
fact, signaling a systemic inadequacy in contract damages, it
might be worth considering a statutory "indifference supple-
ment."
There are many problems with creating a statutory substi-
tute for the "indifference supplement" that the tort of interfer-
ence with contract may now provide in "nonwrongful act" cases.
Would we invoke the rule only in those cases where ordinary
contract damages are most inadequate?215 If so, how might we
adequately define those cases? Or would we apply it across the
board, leaving the job of filtering out some cases to the burdens
of litigation or to the parties' contrary agreement on remedies?
Should the supplement vary with the value of the exchange, or
are all promisees equally burdened in now-unrecoverable ways
by contract breach? These are empirical questions to which,
ideally,21e one would seek answers prior to making policy.
They reveal the extraordinary amount we do not know about the
now-unquantifiable harm that likely accompanies every breach
of contract. And without much more information, a policy maker
attempting to fine-tune the existing contract damages system
would rightly be reluctant to act for fear of creating less
efficiency rather than more.
Less obviously, a recommendation based on efficient breach
that we either eliminate the interference tort or reduce its scope
of frauds for contracts for the sale of goods.
213. U.C.C. § 2-718.
214. This U.C.C. provision applies, of course, only in goods situations and
only where the buyer has made a down payment.
A proposed revision to Article 2 would eliminate § 2-718(2)(b) but continue
to provide that restitution is subject to offset of enforceable liquidated damages.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, JULY 25-AUG.
5, 1994, DISCUSSION DRAFT, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 2,
SALES, § 2-718(2). No reason is given for this particular change.
215. Cf text beginning at supra note 182 and BeVier, supra note 4, at 909
(discussing examples of cases in which ordinary damages would be inadequate).
216. The UCC provision does not show a history of empirical work preceding
its enactment in order to arrive at the 10% or $500 cutoff figures.
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rests on comparable-and unknown-empirical facts. And it
presents the same danger to preexisting efficiency. If, as we
have assumed, the tort may contribute to efficiency by supple-
menting the contract remedies system, limiting or eliminating
the tort might yield a drop in system efficiency. If, as we
assumed at the outset, the tort must be contributing to effi-
ciency, how much efficiency do we lose if we reduce tort liability?
How many promisors or promisees are aware of and affected by
the existence of the tort? Are those who are affected prompted
to more efficient or less efficient action?217 And if the tort is
overbroad, how should we define the appropriate scope for the
tort so that the transaction costs of sorting cases do not exceed
the costs associated with overbreadth?215
The difficulties in assessing the empirical status quo and in
predicting contracting parties' reactions to rule changes only
seem more difficult when we attempt to affirmatively change the
present state of public policy. The fact is, we simply don't know
whether a more efficient system would result from some positive
change in the contract damages system any more than we know
whether a more efficient regime would result from dismantling
the complex tort of interference with contract. Ultimately, the
recommendation to dismantle the tort rests not on true "effi-
ciency" but on the belief that relegating the problem to an
idealized "free market"219 is ultimately better than entrusting
it to government officials and the judicial process.22 ° This
trust in the "free market" biases the analysis; this becomes
217. See supra note 149.
218. Cf BeVier, supra note 4, at 930 (discussing the systemic costs of
overbroad rules).
219. Lumley's age underscores the fact that the world of "freedom of
contract" that underpins much contemporary contracts discourse existed only
in the imagination. Lumley antedated Holmes, Williston, and classical contract
doctrine, or (at best) was contemporary with its development.
220. This seems most evident in the work of Professor BeVier on the subject:
To attribute the existence of these [excessive] costs solely or even
primarily to the inducement tort's overbreadth, however, would be a
mistake. They are instead more appropriately understood as a
function of the profound difficulty of a much more inclusive agenda
that courts have set for themselves, namely, that of policing the overall
fairness of the competitive process. Having as yet discerned no well-
defined criteria for evaluating the fairness of competitive behavior,
performing their self-appointed task would produce uncertainty and
error costs even if courts did not have a potentially over-inclusive
inducement tort as an enforcement mechanism.
BeVier, supra note 4, at 935-36.
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apparent when we pursue the implications of efficient breach in
the real world of transaction costs.
b. Transaction Costs and Uncertainty: The Power of Economic
Incentives in a Real World
Transaction costs in breach-of-contract cases are the costs
that an injured party must sustain in order to get expectation
damages from the other side. Under the American Rule, each
side pays her own lawyer. That means the injured party will get
expectation damages minus her attorneys' fees, and (as many in
business know) in small cases this would be a negative number.
The logic of the efficient breach theory requires "indifference" on
the part of the nonbreaching party. Logically, this would require
that the breacher pay the nonbreaching party her attorneys' fees
as part of the recovery.
Recognizing that transaction costs must be considered is
recognizing that uncertainty will accompany many decisions to
walk away from a relationship. When that uncertainty is
factored into the efficient breach theory, it uncovers a strong
structural bias that virtually guarantees that, as currently
formulated, the theory will produce decisions unlikely to be
"efficient" except by chance. If we were to follow the logic of
efficient breach and award attorneys' fees to the injured party,
the preexisting bias would simply increase. The older literature
on the costs of litigation is useful in uncovering these flaws.
Many years ago, Arthur Leff pointed out that the trans-
action costs involved in collection were not evenly distributed
between plaintiffs and defendants but, rather, varied immensely
depending on whether the party was a consumer or a busi-
ness.22' Businesses have an advantage of mass production in
claims processing, and their legal costs of collection make up a
proportionately smaller part of their cash flow than do legal
costs for typical consumers. Moreover, businesses can spread
and pass on their legal costs by including them in the price of
what they sell, thereby escaping much of the sting in any
event.
222
Leff suggested that this difference in likely transaction costs
221. Leff, supra note 164, at 19-24.
222. Obviously, too many passed-through legal costs, relative to competitors,
could place a business's product at a competitive disadvantage. Conversely,
reducing legal costs will have a positive but indirect effect on a business's
bottom line.
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gave businesses a significant advantage when dealing with
consumers because the litigation process "hurt" consumers more
than it did businesses.2" In a similar vein, Professor Mark
Galanter identified at least nine ways in which "repeat players"
(like businesses) in the litigation process obtain strategic
advantage over "one shotters" (like consumers)." These
disparities surely have an effect on the amount of "incentive"
that a given quantity of transaction costs will provide to those
who make decisions.225
Efficient breach, as usually applied to generate policy
positions, takes no account of transaction costs but, instead,
projects a fully informed would-be breacher assessing the quality
of a competing offer against damages that will make the
promisee "indifferent" to the breach. Embedded in the theory is
the assumption that a contract for the same performance with
a competitor will be a breach and that all parties will know that.
In the real world, things are not nearly so predictable.
In many cases, the decision to walk away from a relation-
ship will carry uncertainty about whether the exit will later be
held to be a breach of contract or not. The promisor may believe
that a contract had not yet formed, or that it is subject to
defenses, or that the other party breached first. If we insert any
uncertainty into the efficient breach paradigm, we get systematic
distortion of the breach decision depending on the nature of the
promisor.
Consider as an extreme example a transaction in which
Business and Consumer have negotiated something, but it is
unclear to both whether walking away from the deal would be a
breach of contract. Suppose each side computes the other's
expectation damages (if there were a contract breach) to be
$10,000 and its own attorneys' fees to be $4,000. Enter Competi-
223. Leff, supra note 164, at 19-24.
224. These include the ability of businesses to plan through drafting the
contract, their ability to enjoy economies of scale, to strategically maximize gain
over many cases, to litigate for the rules themselves, and other similar
advantages. Id. Repeat players included not only businesses in contests with
consumers but also prosecutors, finance companies, landlords, and tax and
municipal authorities. Id. at 107. See Mark Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
OutAhead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Socy REV. 95,
98-103 (1974).
225. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV.
319, 349 (1991) (explaining that individual plaintiffs are quite risk averse with
respect to litigation costs).
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tor with a competing offer. If we assumed that both sides were
certain that walking away from the contract would be a breach,
each would demand enough from Competitor to pay the $10,000
to their first promisee and have something left over. Trans-
action costs would not be a factor. 6
If we reinsert uncertainty into the situation, however, these
two parties will act differently when presented with Competitor's
offer. Consumer's risk of being sued and sustaining her own
$4,000 lawyer bill will cause her to be far more conservative
than Business in deciding whether or not to walk away. That
$4,000 risk (a hefty down payment on a new car, the cost of a
vacation, or a deposit on college tuition) will prompt her to
demand more of Competitor and, therefore, to walk away far less
often under otherwise comparable circumstances than if the
$4,000 meant the same to her budget (or assets or cash flow) as
it does to Business.
From the opposite perspective, Business will be more prone
to be aggressive about the decision whether to breach. Its
attorneys' fees do not represent as large a portion of its cash flow
and, in any event, they could temporarily be passed on to others.
Moreover, Business will know that Consumer's lawyer costs of
pursuing Business for breach make it unlikely that Consumer
will actually seek redress. This will all mean that, in deciding
whether or not to walk away when the legal question of "breach"
is uncertain, Business will walk away far sooner than will
Consumer.
What is important is that the injury to the other contracting
party, and the odds that walking away will be held to be a
breach, remain constant throughout this example. Efficient
breach theory predicts that both parties should walk away at
exactly the same price, yet it seems obvious that the breach
decision will vary, depending on who is deciding whether to
walk.
If this dynamic holds true under the American Rule where
each party pays her own lawyer, it obviously would be accentu-
226. That is, unless one side or the other is acting in "bad faith." Occasion-
ally, such a finding is a predicate to tort liability for bad-faith breach of
contract. See, e.g., Seamans Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of
Calif., 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984) (recognizing that bad faith denial of
existence of a contract can give rise to action in tort); Davis v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
303 N.W.2d 596, 600-01 (Wis. 1981) (punitive damages sustained where
insurance company exhibited bad faith in its claims handling).
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ated under a rule which required the breacher to make the
nonbreacher "whole" by paying the injured party's attorneys' fees
sustained in pursuing the breach claim. The exposure of the
breacher to the other side's attorneys' fees would mean relatively
more to Consumer than it would to Business and would chill
Consumer's pursuit or defense of all but the most certain claims.
Such a fee-shifting rule would not reliably generate Kaldor-Hicks
Compensation Rule decisions but, rather, would produce
decisions to breach that, on the same facts, would vary dramati-
cally with wealth and institutional makeup. We could not
reliably suggest that breach decisions were being made at
"optimal" times from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective because the
decision-making would be complicated by the realities of wealth,
power, and ability to spread risk.
Obviously, the power to induce behavior with economic
incentives becomes enormously complex when one factors in
wealth and the ability to spread risk. Tax specialists have
known this for a long time. My purpose here has only been to
illustrate the primitive and systematically distorted character of
efficient breach analysis, which assumes certainty about whether
walking away is a breach and stick-man uniformity in the
hypothetical persons who are to make the breach decision.
Real people are not uniformly burdened by others' breaches
of their contracts, are not fully compensated by breach-of-
contract damages, and are not uniformly risk averse or risk
aggressive in their decision-making, whether it is to breach a
contract or to pursue the other side for breach. If real people
followed the efficient breach theory, we would probably have a
more inefficient economy. Fortunately, the empirical evidence
is that real people may not be influenced greatly in their
business decisions by the law of contracts. They have probably
refuted in practice the actions called for by efficient breach
theory.
III. VALUES, COMMUNITY, AND CONTRACTING
A. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS VERSUS DECISION-MAKER
PERCEPTION
The assumed validity of both the case law and efficient
breach theory transported us in the last Part to the remarkable
conclusion that where the defendant has merely interfered with
a contract, the law saddles her with liability in order to fine-tune
the breach decision of the two people who actually contracted.
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A corollary of that analysis is that the law of torts requires the
third party to pay damages for what is, by a contracts hypothe-
sis, an entirely innocent act.227
What seems remarkable is the distance between this
analysis that makes Texaco a tool of the larger economic system
and the likely perceptions of the real people who have partici-
pated in interference-with-contract decisions. It is absurd to
suggest that the jurors in the Texaco case thought that by
assessing billions in punitive damages against Texaco, they were
really correcting a faulty incentive system between Pennzoil and
Getty; it seems equally unlikely that the judges who permitted
and sustained a punitive damage assessment believed that,
either. Indeed, if the actors in the legal process had recognized
that they were imposing liability on tort defendants in interfer-
ence cases merely to correct a faulty incentive system operating
on others, chances are the common law in this area would have
developed differently.
The reason for the dramatic divergence between theory and
reality in this area is that the efficient breach analysis of the
interference tort focuses almost exclusively-as typically does
contract law228--on the parties to the original contract. Those
critics proceeding from efficient breach theory condemned the
tort to the extent that it distorted the contracting parties'
incentives. Correspondingly, they approved third-party liability
in those instances where they perceived a need to correct
incentives of the contracting parties.
229
Thus, efficient breach analysts viewed the interference tort
through the two-party classical contract paradigm and evaluated
it on the basis of whether it advanced or retarded the narrowly
defined efficiency goal, defined by the very structure of the
analysis as the primary policy objective for consideration. We
are bound to find a convoluted analysis if, in fact, the tort
advances values other than this kind of efficiency or protects
interests other than those of the immediate parties to the
227. This interesting proposition is assertable within an economic analysis
of liability because that analysis is concerned with expanding economic welfare;
at whose expense it is expanded is, to the true-believing contractarian, a
decidedly secondary "distributional" concern.
228. The expansion of contract doctrine to recognize the interests of third-
party beneficiaries is, of course, a major exception to the more typical two-party
focus.
229. BeVier, supra note 4, at 888-93; Partlett, supra note 6, at 794-806.
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contract."0
This central problem in analyzing the tort in efficient breach
terms is an instance of a problem found in individualist contract
theory more generally. The contractarian's unrealistically
individualist projection of contract law231 tends to view con-
tracting parties as riveted on their self-interest with absolutely
no regard for the interests of the other party. This focus on
individuals within the contract tends to exclude awareness of the
contracting parties as a unit or of the interests and activities of
nonparties.
Efficient breach principles would, for example, suggest that
contracting parties would (should?) constantly be breaching in
order to get the ubiquitous "better deal."232 Yet the evidence
suggests that parties do not breach and go elsewhere nearly to
the extent that efficient breach ideas would suggest.2 33  The
real-world parties' actions may thereby reflect economic (or
other) value in relationships that is not captured by efficient
breach analysis.
Trust between the parties is one such value. As one of my
students remarked, "When you know your supplier, you don't
have to count the widgets."2  Contract damages in this
230. A more extreme and primitive form of the same reasoning would be the
reverse. It would ask whether a rule imposing liability on a manufacturer for
a defective consumer product would advance or retard the efficient decisions of
the manufacturer and wholesaler who initially contracted to convey the product.
Whether a consumer who was injured by a defective product should be
compensated for that injury by the maker of the product would be largely beside
the point. A rigorous form of strict privity would bar contract liability to the
end user under these circumstances and, until MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E.
1050 (N.Y. 1916), barred negligence liability as well.
231. Neoclassical contract, with its large numbers of exceptions to such
classical staples as consideration, offer and acceptance, and "freedom of
contract," nonetheless offers us an individualist paradigm into which complex,
multivariable problems are force-fit. The complexity of modem contract
doctrine and the augmenting systems of restitution and tort are symptoms that
the individualist paradigm captures only part (and perhaps only a small part)
of the picture. Contractarian reasoning leaves out the exceptions that modern
contract law has had to include.
232. If we factor in the expense of enforcing claims for breach of contract, the
predicted frequency of breach would seem even higher because the rational
maximizer would believe she could get away with the breach, at least in smaller
cases.
233. Macaulay, supra note 148, at 109-10.
234. An economist might argue that this is because individuals find other
economic value in maintaining a relationship. This added value within
relationships is a main focus of the transaction-cost scholars following Oliver
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1103
quintessentially fungible goods case certainly would not include
a plaintiff's new costs of employing a widget counter.
Other implications of the individualist focus go beyond the
parties to the immediate contract. First, when we view the
situation as involving only two individuals bound by their
promises to one another, we tend not to see the possibility that
their relationship may have value to those outside the relation-
ship. A similar perceptual limitation accounts for the obstacles
the doctrine of privity erected to contract's embrace of third-
party beneficiary rights. 5 and for privity's power to delay tort
law's recognition of negligence liability in the product liability
context.236 The two-party focus of the efficient breach analysis
limits our legal imagination.
Second, in the particular context of interference liability, the
tendency of a two-party analysis to focus on the contracting
parties also diverts us from paying attention to the third party
who interrupted the relationship and the rightness or wrongness
of that tort defendant's actions. 237 Attending to this particular
third party would appear to be central in any case where
decision makers punish the outsider for merely interfering with
a contract. An analysis such as efficient breach that disregards
a central consideration used by decision makers within the legal
process (here, the quality of the defendant's actions) is bound to
yield, at minimum, incomplete (and probably distorted) norma-
tive recommendations.28
Williamson. See supra note 166 (surveying authorities who adopt a relation-
ship-value analysis).
235. See Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 270 (1859).
236. See MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
237. Professor Dobbs considered the "wrongness" of the defendant's conduct
in pure interference cases and concluded, partly on the basis of an ethic derived
from efficient breach theory that the tort penalizes conduct that is not wrongful.
Dobbs, supra note 43, at 360-61; cf Epstein, supra note 4, at 27 (explaining
appropriation by tortfeasor of the promisee's property is inherently "wrongful").
Professor Epstein's analysis is consistent with a commercial trend to treat
contract rights as "property," but it begs the question to analyze the wrongful-
ness of the defendant's actions by reference to another legal conclusion (contract
rights are "property") arrived at for different reasons.
238. To assess punitive damages, the decision maker has to consider the
character of the defendant's act. Efficient breach theory defines that solely by
reference to the two parties to the contract. As suggested in the last section,
efficient breach theory would conclude that the defendant's act should yield tort
liability (if at all) because contract damages are not capable of making the
plaintiff indifferent to the promisor's breach. It would indeed be difficult to
assess punitive damages if this were the view one took of the liability question.
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At the more general level, efficient breach theory's tendency
to disregard third parties reveals a structural flaw in
"contractarian" analysis. Like efficient breach, contractarian
analysis tends to consider policy questions on the basis of
directly affected individuals motivated by a very narrowly
defined self-interest.2 39  To the extent that contractarian
analysis-like efficient breach theory-diverts attention from
"outsider" interests and actions regarded as important by
conscientious actors within the legal system, that analysis will
offer an incomplete explanation of the cases and an inadequate
foundation on which to build policy.24°
A broader analysis of the tort is required, and a useful place
to begin is with the norms that decision makers seem to bring to
the tort in cases such as Lumley or Texaco. It is apparent from
the punitive damage award in Texaco that the decision mak-
ers-jury and judges-believed that Texaco's conduct was wrong
and to be condemned. But what lies behind the apparent moral
condemnation so vividly announced in that case? What could
judge or jury find "wrong" with knowingly extending a better
offer to a party already bound by contract and thereby inducing
a breakup of the parties to the original contract?241
One answer may be bound up with a perennial contract-law
problem-whether there is a moral component to promising that
goes beyond a requirement of "full" compensation for the
promisee. Modern writers from at least Holmes's time on 2
239. It is, of course, in the interests of each party to a relationship to trust
the other; several transaction-cost economists have suggested that trust has real
economic value within relationships. Contractarian analysis, on the other hand,
generally starts with individuals who are relative strangers with little care for
or trust of one another, asks what they would do under this or that rule, and
projects policy recommendations from the answer.
240. An unduly narrow view of the law of property similarly tends to
generate policy responses that screen out important third-party interests that
we, as a culture, may believe important. See generally Singer, supra note 172
(discussing the moral justification of property rights to the extent they allow the
protection of interests and relationships of non-property owning people).
241. In Texaco, the vagaries of a yet-unclosed multi-million dollar deal made
the "moment" of contract formation unclear. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729
S.W.2d 765, 788-89 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). New York law required a "contract"
as a predicate for tort liability, and the jury dutifully found one. Id. at 795.
One doubts, however, that the jury would have felt any differently about the
conduct involved in the case if Texaco had intervened a "moment before" rather
than a "moment after" that contract formed.
242. See Holmes, supra note 67 (claiming breach of contract only requires
payment of damages).
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have debated the question whether it is wrong to breach a
contract, even if the legal system will fully compensate the
promisee. The contract-law prohibition on punitive damages243
and its preference for substitutional relief announce the view
that the law contains no moral component. But the fact that
contract law reflects an amorality' does not support the
proposition that it should, or that our culture is morally
indifferent to contract breach.245
In cases like Lumley or Texaco, we have a contract that the
promisor breached for no better reason than to make more
money. Whatever one's views on the morality of breaching
generally, it would seem less debatable as an empirical matter
that Posner's moral imperative246-- breach if you can sell your
goods or services to a sufficiently higher bidder-turns a
commonly held moral judgment upside down. The punitive
damage award in Texaco may well reflect this moral judgment:
as initiator and participant in the breach-for-more-money,
Texaco is at least as culpable as Getty for violating common
243. White v. Benkowski, 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Wis. 1967), a staple of many
contracts courses, rejected punitive damages in a contract case even where the
contract was found to be maliciously breached for harassment purposes.
244. See generally Linzer, supra note 7 (examining the amoral stance
reflected in Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
245. Id. See generally Linzer supra note 81 (demonstrating society's and the
legal system's responses to contract breaches by examining employment cases).
246. Richard Posner advocates that the system be structured to motivate the
promisor to breach when it is sufficiently profitable for her to do so. POSNER,
supra note 138, at 119. The reason for so structuring the system is so that
parties will take advantage of the incentives it provides and create efficient
outcomes.
Posner does distinguish what he calls "opportunistic breaches," but he
defines the opportunistic breach very narrowly:
It makes a difference in deciding which remedy to grant whether the
breach was opportunistic. If a promisor breaks his promise merely to
take advantage of the vulnerability of the promisee in a setting (the
normal contract setting) where performance is sequential rather than
simultaneous, we might as well throw the book at the promisor. An
example would be where A pays B in advance for goods and instead of
delivering them B uses the money in another venture. Such conduct
has no economic justification and ought to be deterred. ... The
promisor broke his promise in order to make money-there can be no
other reason in the case of such a breach.
Id. at 117. Posner adds, however, that a voluntary breach, such as that
described in the text, is "not opportunistic ... but efficient-which from an
economic standpoint [makes it] the same case as that of an involuntary breach."
Id. at 118.
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norms.247 Indeed, one might go further and argue from these
tort cases that our willingness to punish the intermeddler in the
tort setting, where there are no a priori limitations on damages,
reveals widely held views about the morality of promise keeping
and that current damage restrictions in contract law reflect not
a cultural amorality about keeping promises, but limitations on
risk felt to be necessary despite a contrary cultural norm. Were
contract law to permit punitive damages, one suspects the
breacher in Texaco would have suffered a similar fate at the
hands of the decision maker.4
The fact that a contract-centered analysis such as efficient
breach cannot capture a norm that seems to be at work in
interference cases points up a shortcoming of that form of
analysis. The occasional recognition of a tort of bad faith breach
of contract 9 is a comparable symptom of the shortcomings of
our individualistic contract analysis. But debunking an inade-
quate contract-centered analysis doesn't establish the proposition
that it is wrong to interfere with a contract. Even if it were
empirically determined that most people react with moral
revulsion to the actions of a Texaco, it would not necessarily be
good morality or good policy that the law reflect that moral
revulsion.25
Rather than attempting to explain the interference cases on
moral grounds per se, I hope to suggest that there may be good,
247. The punitive damages award against Texaco reflected juror condem-
nation of breacher Getty's actions as well. 2 MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 23,
at 186. See also supra note 39.
248. As one would expect, commentators proceeding from a contractarian
perspective draw an inference opposite to mine and reject punitive damages in
interference cases. See Myers, supra note 122, at 1141-42 ("If [the defendant's
actions don't involve a serious, independent wrong] the plaintiff's recovery
logically should be limited to actual damages and perhaps attorneys' fees.")
(emphasis added); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 1004 (claiming
inappropriateness of finding an interfering defendant liable for damages in
excess of ordinary contract measure). Note that the "buy out" postulated by
Prosser and Keeton only happens in theory. Efficient breach does not currently
require a tender to the promisee of full expectation damages as a prerequisite
to a breach-for-profit by the promisor.
249. Probably the most debated recent case of that kind is Seaman's Direct
Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984), overruled by
Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 64 USLW 2160 (Cal. 1995).
250. Our history is littered with cultural norms that are widely regarded
today as wrong. Segregation and sex discrimination are two obvious ones. One
can only speculate on how our children will view our current debates on such
controversial contemporary issues as the death penalty and abortion.
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empirically verifiable reasons for condemning a Texaco's activity
even if its activities were competitively motivated. In advancing
these tentative reasons, I also hope to make a broader point: this
tort may be protecting interests and furthering policy goals that
simply cannot be seen through an analysis grounded in classical
or neoclassical contract. We cannot begin to understand the role
this tort plays in the law of transactions if we continue to
approach it from within the contract-law system.
B. "1RELATIONAL" INTERESTS AND THE COSTS OF CONTRACTING
A different analytical framework for considering interests
that contract law has difficulty recognizing was offered in 1934
by Leon Green. Green suggested that the tort of interference
with contract protected not one party's expectation nor "prop-
erty" but "relational interests."25' He argued for explicit
recognition of "relational interests'--a category that would
include more than "contractual" relationships-as proper
subjects for legal protection. The analysis rendered insignificant
the causation problems implicit in the tort252 and more accu-
rately reflected the case law that protected relationships that did
not amount to "contracts." What makes Green's 1934 lexicon
worth considering in 1995, however, is the intervening develop-
ment of a "relational" contracts literature and an associated
economics literature focused on transaction costs.
253
251. Green, Part 1, supra note 72, at 460-62 (1934). Part of Green's goal in
defining relational interests was to reject the "property" nomenclature often
found in the cases. Professor Dobbs suggests that the Legal Realist movement,
of which Green was a part, might account for the popularity of the tort. He
criticizes as well Pound's "interest analysis" for basing liability on interests
which are perceived as valuable but without taking into countervailing societal
interests. Dobbs, supra note 43, at 363-64.
252. See supra Part I.B.2. (discussing the problems of causation in
interference torts).
253. Since the mid-1970s, the notion of "relational contracts" has come into
our contract vocabulary. See generally Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of
Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974) (suggesting that traditional contract law
was too narrow to accommodate the much wider range of relationships with
which contract law should be concerned and was also the wrong model under
which to adjudicate complex, long-term contractual relationships).
Charles Goetz and Robert Scott have also spawned a relational contracts
literature, focusing much of their analysis on contracts where "the parties are
incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined
obligations." Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1091; see supra note 169
(explaining how Macneil and Goetz's and Scott's analyses differ at a funda-
mental level in their willingness to frame contract questions in an economics-
1170
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
If we think of the interference-tort case law as being
concerned with protecting various relationships from outside
interference by third parties, we find that the tort enhances
relational stability. Under contract law, parties to a consensual
business or other relationship remain free to breach their
obligations or dissolve their relationship, and the contract
system will usually decide the effects of the parties' decisions on
one another. However, the maintenance or destruction of the
relationship lies in the decision of the parties, not that of others;
the tort contributes stability by insulating their decisions from
outside influences.
But relational stability has a downside: if the tort enhances
such stability, it does so by impeding the formation of new
relationships by persons bound in the old ones. 4 This is the
nub of the efficient breach critique.
We thus return to the fundamental tension reflected in this
tort-the relative instability of the efficient breach regime,
where parties breach to move resources to those that value them
more, versus the relational stability that this torts deterrent
yields. But Green's articulation of the case law allows us to
frame this tension in a usefully different form: Why might it be
in society's interest for tort law to stabilize relationships more
securely than does contract law? The question redirects our
attention to the social (as distinguished from party) benefits of
more relational stability and may lead us to reasons for con-
demning the third party who disrupts that stability.
As suggested earlier in connection with criticisms of efficient
breach analysis, 55 often there are third parties, otherwise
unprotected by the law, who come to rely in meaningful ways on
contracts (or other relationships). When a contract is broken,
those persons can suffer uncompensated loss, and the incidence
based, individualistic way); see generally Macneil, supra note 140. Cf Feinman,
supra note 11, at 45 n.4 (distinguishing Macneil's notions of relational contract
theory from other's); A. Brooke Overby, Bondage, Domination, and the Art of the
Deal: An Assessment of Judicial Strategies in Lender Liability Good Faith
Litigation, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 985-86 n.118 (1993) (explaining Macneil's
view of relational contractual exchanges).
254. This darker side is particularly evident in those cases where businesses
brought tort actions against groups attempting to organize tenants or
employees. E.g., South Wales Miners' Fed. v. Glamorgan Coal Co., 2 KB. 545
(1903), affd, A.C. 239 (H.L. 1905). One could imagine a fear of interference-
with-contract liability impeding the organizing efforts.
255. See text supra accompanying notes 170-175.
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of such losses can be reduced by making contracts more resistant
to outside interference. To take a simple example, suppose a
seller employs five workers through at-will employment arrange-
ments to design and build (using the buyer's materials) a
product for the buyer. Collectively, these workers will be paid
$200,000 for their work, and the seller will deliver the work to
the buyer for $220,000, netting a $20,000 profit. Before the
work starts, a second seller with a better offer (say $195,000)
finds the buyer, and as a result the buyer breaches the first
contract. If damages are measured by the contract price less
costs saved, the original seller will net her $20,000 profit from
the buyer and, in theory,256 the buyer will still be ahead.
Significantly, however, the workers will lose their employment,
and the broader community will lose the benefit of the
employees' spending power2 Both workers and community
have been affected by the breach in a very real way but, by
hypothesis, they have no remedy.
There are lots of reactions to this sob story; the economist
would have at least two. First, inasmuch as the second seller
will employ workers to do the same work, there is no net
economic loss, simply a shifting of the work from the first seller's
workers and locale to the second's. Second, in place of the
original workers' old work will be new work, and consequently
their losses and those of their community will be minimal.
Indeed, in a frictionless world with perfect markets, the first
workers and their community would suffer no loss at all because
they would instantly be reemployed and new work would
instantly replace the old within the community.
The divergence of the real world from the world of perfect
markets and zero transaction costs259 is what throws real loss
on the first workers and, indeed, on the local economy in which
256. The two-party problems with this standard efficient breach example are
detailed supra in the text accompanying notes 150-169.
257. The community will also lose taxes on the income and spending of the
now-broke workers.
258. For purposes of my example, the assumption is that the workers would
have worked if the contract had stood and have no rights (other than
unemployment benefits or similar public rights) on account of the breach. It
seems unlikely that they could prevail on a third-party beneficiary theory. Cf.
Martinez v. Socoma, Inc. 521 P.2d 841 (Cal. 1974).
259. See Lynn LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to
Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 99 (1992) (referring
satirically to hypothetical perfect markets with zero transaction costs as the
"PM-ZTC" world).
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they spend their wages. They will not instantly get new jobs,
and the employment lost to the local community will not
immediately be replaced by new employment. Even if we
assume that the work lost in one place is entirely offset by its
reappearance in some other locale, there remain the real costs
to real people of moving the work from one place to the next.
If the overall economic objective is to expand the size of the
economic pie, these broader costs must be taken into account in
making policy decisions. It is here that efficient breach, classical
contract doctrine, and related forms of contractarian analysis
reach their limits and may begin to distort policy choices. Their
two-party focus tends to exclude any consideration of the effects
of a breach on third parties and, indeed, obscures our ability
even to recognize-much less quantify-those costs. And even
where these costs are recognized, they are trivialized by the
terms "transaction costs" or "externalities"26' and assumed (for
purposes of the individualistic analysis) not to exist.
We may, however, get the opposite bias when we return to
the real world of judges and juries. In Lumley-type cases, the
defendant has disrupted the status quo of contract. A decision
maker can probably perceive diffuse but real costs that the
disruption has caused, and may not as readily see the more
theoretical economic benefits to the public of moving resources
to a more highly valued use. 2  The moral condemnation that
attaches to the defendant's conduct in these cases might well be
connected to our common experience with the costs of disruption
and our lack of experience with its benefits. 3
260. See Singer, supra note 172, at 614-20 (discussing the United States
Steel Company shutdown of its Youngstown, Ohio operation).
261. While much of contemporary economic analysis pays attention to
transaction costs, contractarians focus on the transaction costs of the two
parties to the contract, not on other costs of change that fall on nonparties. See
supra note 169 (discussing different theorist's focus). While party transaction
costs are, indeed, important, they form only part (and perhaps a small part) of
the picture.
262. Obviously some of the costs of disruption are those nonrecoverable costs
to the injured party that accompany any breach of contract. But, in theory, at
least some of those could be captured in a breach suit against the promisor or
in compensatory damages against the tort defendant. But punitive damages go
beyond compensation of a party to the original contract. The hypothesis
advanced in the text is that punitive damages in a Lumley-type interference
case may serve to penalize an act that causes a far more generalized harm to
a public affected by a disrupted contract.
263. If the tort functions to reduce transaction costs and side effects by
reducing outsider-induced breaches, it is at best a crude mechanism for the
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Looking at the interference tort from the perspective of the
wider community underscores the fact that very little contract
analysis-and nearly no economic analysis-takes an expanded
view of the winners, losers, and costs involved in forming and
ending business relationships.26 More generally, current
contract doctrine itself, with its tendency to focus on the
contracting parties and its demand for crisp rules, is conceptu-
ally incapable of taking account of the broader range of interests
implicated in the premature ending of a contractual relation-
ship.265 What is worse, the individualist approach that domi-
nates modern contract doctrine and our tendency to use it
exclusively to think about business problems may actually
inhibit our consideration of these broader societal interests. 6
This seems to have been the case in the bankruptcy and
corporate governance literature, where contractarian analysis
has tended to exclude any consideration of the effects of business
decisions or failure on third parties without preexisting legal
task. Contracts will vary in the amount of otherwise uncompensated losses that
accompany breach, yet the tort is undiscriminating in its deterrence. While
punitive damages will vary with the degree of disruption that the defendant has
caused by inducing a breach, the protection of diffuse third-party interests
depends on the contract not being interfered with in the first place. For those
contemplating interference with a contract, the unpredictable nature of punitive
damages will probably deter in a way that is not well calibrated to predicted or
actual harm.
On the other hand, the tort operates in this context no more crudely than
does efficient breach theory. The public gains that can result from moving
resources to better uses will vary with the contract. Neither efficient breach
theory nor the interference tort acknowledges that there are both costs and
benefits of change, even if the costs of moving a resource to a better use and the
economic benefits of doing so are seldom quantifiable.
264. See Markovits, supra note 20.
265. See Northern Del. Indus. Dev. Corp. v. E.W. Bliss Co., 245 A.2d 431,
431-34 (Del. Ch. 1968) (refusing to grant an order to increase the number of
workers on a factory renovation project even though the plaintiff would unlikely
be fully compensated for delays in construction and the delays would have a
large negative impact on the local economy and the factory workers). Cf
ARTHUR ROSETr, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 348 (5th ed. 1994).
266. There is a similar problem in the contemporary debate about the
usefulness of Chapter 11 reorganization. The strict efficiency view would
reduce the use of Chapter 11 in the interests of allowing only strong businesses
to survive. This view either minimizes or assumes away the costs to third
parties, such as employees, of the disruption accompanying dissolution. A
different view advocates explicit recognition of these disruptive effects. See
generally KAREN GROSS, BREAKING BENCHES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CONTEMPO-
RARY BANKRUPTCY LAW (forthcoming 1996); Karen Gross, Taking Community
Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994).
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rights.267
That modern contract doctrine cannot easily accommodate
interests that may nonetheless be socially or economically
important underscores the promise of alternative visions of
contract and of the contracting process. The classical con-
tract paradigm posits two individuals entering into a negotiated,
"one-shot" deal, driven by their self-interest and having no
regard for the interests of others who might be affected by their
contracting or their performance under their contract. The
paradigm has proved durable and serviceable, but it is an open
secret that it is incomplete. Modern contract law accommodates
a far broader range of interests than the logic of the classical
system permits. Strict privity has long since given way,269 and
strict consideration doctrine has accommodated reliance. Article
2 of the U.C.C. has sufficient deviations from the classical
contracts offer-and-acceptance paradigm that the paradigm
seems of truly marginal significance.27 0  But while classical
contract is not "dead," the continued survival of the paradigm
may be due not to its inherent qualities so much as to the fact
it is extensively supplemented by statutory provisions 27 ' and
restitution and tort law. Yet the paradigm (without the messy
complexity or supplementation) remains the bedrock of
contractarian analysis.
The interference tort is part of this larger phenomenon. It
demonstrates once again that the individualist paradigm
furnishes an incomplete picture, and it underscores the con-
tinued need to consider more inclusive ways of thinking about
the law governing relations among people (most obviously
contract law, but also the related law of torts, restitution,
267. The literature is summarized in Ponoroff, supra note 18.
268. This promise is embodied in the work of some. See generally Jay M.
Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 303 (1992)
(proposing that contract law move to a relational analysis); Peter Linzer, Is
Consent the Essence of Contract?-Replying to Four Critics, 1988 ANN. SURV.
Am. LAW 213 (explaining that dealings throughout contractual relationships are
more central than the issue of consent); Macneil, supra note 140 (suggesting
that relational models better accommodate long-term contractual situations).
269. Statutory expressions are myriad. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-210, 2-318
(1990) (recognizing delegation of performance and third-party beneficiaries to
warranties, respectively).
270. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-207 (indicating that agreement can be
inferred from a variety of actions).
271. Labor law, anti-discrimination law, and consumer protection law all
have such statutory protections.
1996] 1175
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1103
bankruptcy, and even corporations).
The interference tort also points to the continued usefulness
of the broad kind of transaction-cost economic analysis, pio-
neered by Oliver Williamson, in discovering the real economic
costs and benefits of contracting.272 While that approach, too,
limits its focus to the particular parties to a contract, its analysis
of the dynamics of contracting is far richer than the incentive
analysis that characterizes much economics-based literature
dealing with contract law,"' and its direct engagement of the
costs of change is a refreshing counterbalance to an economic
analysis that either assumes those costs away or looks at them
too narrowly. At a larger scale, our national political judgments
often consider the costs of change in assessing policy choices that
have economic implications. To the extent that the efficient
breach theory and other normative analyses of contract speak to
the economically optimal tightness of the contractual bond, a
richer analysis of all of the costs of "breach and new contract"
would improve prospects for continued development of an
economically realistic contract doctrine.
C. "RELATIONAL" INTERESTS AND THE SCOPE OF THE TORT
Viewing the tort as a mechanism to protect relationships
rather than the promisee's expectation interests also frees
analysis for direct consideration of the appropriate scope for the
tort. Recall that the case law has supported liability for
interfering with business relationships embodied in at-will
contracts, defective contracts, and sometimes, no contracts at
all. 4 This expansion of the tort beyond the fixed-term con-
tract is certainly curious if viewed from the perspective of the
contract system. Logically, if you don't have a "contract," how
can someone interfere with "it"? Many commentators"5 have
criticized the tort's expansion beyond the fixed-term contract in
the absence of independently "wrongful" conduct. 6  Their
272. See sources cited supra note 166.
273. Cf Masten, supra note 13, at 182.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 22-36 (surveying relationships in
which courts have found interference liability).
275. Because he believed noncontractual business relationships could be
valuable and yet the promisee had no remedy in contract, one commentator
diverged from the others and argued that the tort should extend to noncontracts
but not to contracts. Dowling, supra note 6, at 126-27.
276. Grothe, supra note 74, at 474; Myers, supra note 122, at 1141; Perlman,
supra note 6, at 69-97; Sales, supra note 6, at 126-27.
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contract-centered criticism emerges as a matter of simple logic:
Rules regulating third party interference should advance whatever
policy contract law pursues in withholding enforcement of an agree-
ment. . . . If the efficiency principles of contract law suggest that a
third party using lawful means should not be liable for inducing breach
of enforceable promises, then a fortiori, the same rule should apply to
unenforceable expectancies.
7
The problem with the analysis is that it proceeds from classical
contract principles and doctrine rather than from a broader
perspective.
The question is not whether the plaintiff has an interest, as
defined by contract doctrine, that is worth protecting. Rather,
the problem is whether to impose liability or compensate the
plaintiff when a stranger disrupts a relationship that otherwise
would have continued. Implicitly relegating this decision to
classical contract doctrine suggests that there cannot be a
socially valuable relationship that is not enforceable as a
contract. Stated this way, the logical criticism seems untenable,
even in business situations. 8
The contractarian perspective proceeds, again, from doctrine
premised on individualism without regard to broader social
interests. In addition, courts have shaped contract liability rules
with considerable attention to limiting the promisor's liability
lest it exceed the risk supposedly assumed when contracting.
79
Focusing on the two parties to the contract may be functional
when resolving disputes between those parties; but transporting
that focus into a system such as tort, which does not predicate
liability upon consent, seems counterintuitive.
We have, by hypothesis, cases where the relationship would
277. Perlman, supra note 6, at 90-91 (emphasis supplied); see Sales, supra
note 6, at 148-49 ("The more stable, predictable and principled remedies of
contract, rather than the unprincipled and unpredictable doctrine of tort, should
furnish the basis for defining the parameters of liability.").
278. One might argue that because contract law provides sharp "in or out"
lines that assist in adjudication, it should be imported to set limits to the
interference tort. See Macneil, supra note 253, at 738 ("Sharp in by clear
agreement; sharp out by clear performance."); cf Sales, supra note 6, at 48-49
(arguing that contract law is more stable than tort law). This proposition is
more tenable than that criticized in the text and, depending on one's point of
view with respect to contract law, might be persuasive. I believe (as did Karl
Llewellyn and many others) that the "certainty" thought to reside in contract
law is largely an illusion. See supra text accompanying notes 114-119.
279. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1845), is probably
the most famous example of a court limiting the promisor's risks of contracting.
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have continued280 and where the plaintiff suffered real losses
because of the interference. The tort question, whether-and
under what circumstances-to impose nonconsensual liability,
should depend partly on whether we find personal and social
value in business and other relationships not embodied in fixed-
term contracts, and partly on how we view third-party interfer-
ence with such relationships. That contract law does not require
the other contracting party to compensate the plaintiff when the
relationship ends means only that. It does not mean that the
plaintiff has suffered no loss, or that there was no personal or
social value to the continuation of the relationship, or that it
"should" have ended when it did, or that public policy may not
support imposing liability on the third party.
Setting aside contract doctrine as supplying the principles
for deciding the range of tort liability for interference with
relationships permits us more easily to attend to the policy
issues that might be implicated in a given interference case.
How important was the relationship both to the parties and to
others? Were there justifications for the interference? If the
defendant had a better offer to make, what justification was
there in going to the promisor rather than to the promisee?
280. Part of the plaintiffs proof in any interference case is to show that "but
for" the interference the relationship would have continued, or that the
interference "caused" the loss. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66. In
contracts at will and relationships that have not ripened into contracts, the
plaintiff will, in addition, have to show how long the relationship would have
continued in order to prove damages (a fixed-term contract takes this factor out
of the case). Causation and damages will not likely be susceptible of mathe-
matical proof and can lead to unpredictability injury verdicts. Criticism of the
tort or its expansion on that basis reflects skepticism towards jury discretion.
Cf Dobbs, supra note 43, at 346 (noting that lack of guiding principles in
applying interference tort law causes doubt in the legal system).
Challenges to the tort on the basis of the difficulties it presents in
forecasting jury decisions are not subject to the same observations as the
analysis discussed in the text. But the same challenges would apply as well to
many other well-established areas ofbusiness law such as intellectual property,
antitrust, and, I would argue, contract law itself. If Pennzoil had sued Getty
for breach of contract, the same issue at the center of the Texaco tort case
(contract formation in the context of a complex negotiation) would have been
formally before the jury. It would not have been any more predictable as a
contract case.
Like many other areas of law, the tort of interference with contract can
raise difficult proof problems. I know of no way to determine when the
difficulty and expense of proving a claim justify its elimination; to argue that
the uncertainty costs require the tort be curtailed is to make an unwarranted
empirical assertion.
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Unfortunately, once we reduce the significance of "contract"
in defining legally cognizable relationships, we are left with a
continuum of relationships with no clear demarcation between
"significant" and "insignificant." This makes deciding the
appropriate scope of the tort much more difficult because there
remains the doctrinal job of defining in some adjudicable form
the combination of plaintiff's interest and defendant's conduct
that should result in liability. Given the possible variations in
both relational value and degrees of interference, it is no
surprise that tort law has identified no better criterion than
"improper" to describe conduct that will result in liability."'
Such a vague criterion leaves to overworked courts the difficult
job of explaining, case by case, how public policy is served or
disserved by a finding of liability.
It is therefore also no surprise that some courts have
enlisted contract law to circumscribe the scope of the interfer-
ence tort. Courts can use contract doctrine to generate crisp
answers to the scope of interference liability without having to
appeal to public policy for support. Yet because contract law
addresses different issues than does the interference tort, its use
here is not based on substantive policy. Rather, in this context
contract law performs the administrative function of making
case-by-case adjudication easier and somewhat more predictable.
If we acknowledge that, as a policy matter, there is no good
reason for limiting this tort to fixed-term contracts, and that
contract doctrine may be serving only an administrative, line-
drawing function in interference cases, two consequences follow.
First, it would then make no principled difference whether the
line is drawn at "enforceable contract" or "unenforceable
contract." For a court could just as easily find a "contract" in an
agreement that is subject to promisor defenses or is terminable
by the promisor as it can in one that is fully enforceable in all
respects. Indeed, with contracts subject to promisor defenses, at
least,282 the line is probably better drawn where most courts
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
282. The complexity generated by the privilege of competition and more
difficult proof of damage in at-will contracts could support, on administrative
grounds, rejection of liability across the board if one concluded that the costs of
adjudication in these cases outweighed the social benefits of enhanced
contractual stability. What is important, however, is to recognize that we would
be weighing here the different administrative costs of tort adjudication as a
basis for line-drawing, not some principle that has importance only within the
contract system.
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have drawn it.2" 3 Given the intentional character of the
defendant's disruptive conduct, it is incoherent to have her tort
liability depend on contract-law defenses of which the tort
defendant was likely ignorant.
Second, recognizing the administrative nature of contract
law's rules in this context points up the need for a continued
search for tort principles that will better express the social
values implicated in protecting existing relationships from
outside interference. There may be a better device for screening
claims than a contract/no contract dichotomy, but to discover
that device we have to recognize the limited role contract law
plays in this tort context.
We might draw some final inferences from the tort cases
that allow recovery against the defendant in at-will and other
situations in which the promisee would not have recovered in
contract against the promisor. The existence of these cases
suggests that our common-law tort system recognizes social
value in business relationships where contract law does not.
Rather than conclude that these cases are "wrong" for their
apparent conflict with contract principles, we should recognize
the obvious point that contract law has never encompassed the
entire universe of transactions that have social value. If
interference-tort cases reflect social value in relationships where
the contract system would deny recovery, it may be fruitful to
continue the search for contract principles that better capture
the value our society ascribes to a broad range of relationships.
It may be that an individualist conception of contract law is best
for most cases and that the cases that do not fit can be ad-
dressed through the myriad "inconsistent" neoclassical contract
rules, through legislation, through restitution, or through
tort.2" Or it may be that those who engage in transactions
283. See supra notes notes 75-79 and accompanying text (surveying instances
where courts find that a promisor's defense does not block recovery).
284. An example might be J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
There, a restaurant that leased space within an airport successfully recovered
against a contractor who negligently performed air conditioning work for the
lessor, thereby causing the restaurant to lose sales. Id. at 64. While the case
was decided on tort principles, the court could as well have decided it by
stretching the contract doctrines governing the rights of third-party beneficia-
ries. Not surprisingly, under either analysis the central focus is the source of
a duty running from the contractor to the tenant. Gary T. Schwartz, Economic
Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and Products Liability, 23
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 37, 41 (1986).
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would be better served by an expanded contract law that
recognized the real value of some relationships that do not now
have legal sanction in contract law. But we cannot even begin
to ask such questions if we proceed from within a contractarian
framework
CONCLUSION
As one reflects on the contemporaneous cases of Hadley v.
Baxendale and Lumley v. Gye and the long lines of authority and
analysis they have spawned, one cannot help but consider their
seeming inconsistency as simply reflecting different ways of
thinking about and addressing the complexities of human
relations and human exchange. Indeed, it seems more likely
that these cases are complementary rather than inconsistent and
reflect the fact that the classical contract system as conceived
then and used by contractarians now is structurally incapable of
addressing all the problems involved in the break-up of relation-
ships.
Hadley represents our strong individualist strain. That
strain in our culture saw the flowering of classical contract
doctrine in the late nineteenth century and of contractarian
reasoning in the late twentieth. Both have difficulty with those
not parties to an agreement, and, when applied to protect
broader interests, both generate policy results at odds with
prevailing norms. As it became modern, contract law retained
its individualistic paradigm but softened it with many well-
known doctrines that are at odds with a rigorously individualis-
tic approach. As epitomized by efficient breach theory,
contractarian reasoning has taken the individualist strain from
classical contract law but left nearly all of its twentieth-century
development behind.
Still, the largely individualist approach that continues to
dominate the modern contract system limits our ability to
consider many of the transaction costs and third-party losses
flowing from disrupted relationships. The Lumley line of cases
may well supplement modern contract law by helping to reduce
those costs and losses. Thus, rather than being at odds with
contract principles, these tort cases may actually help preserve
the individualist contract system as we know it by permitting
that system to ignore such losses. Without this tort, we might
be harder pressed to find a different conception of the law of
contracts.
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That the contract system may require supplementation from
tort does not necessarily condemn contract; it merely under-
scores the fact that contract law is a human construct that is
neither perfect nor all-inclusive. It is and must be augmented
in real life by other areas of law that serve values other than
individualism because people and their problems extend beyond
the individualist paradigm. Contractarian reasoning is not
burdened by messy reality and need not take account of cultural
strains that do not fit that paradigm. But that means such
reasoning, used normatively, produces policy recommendations
that areinevitably incomplete and systematically distorted.
Fortunately, like Hadley, Lumley has stood the test of time.
It has been provocative for most of its long history. If Hadley
represents our individualist values, Lumley stands for our values
of community. Both are cultural artifacts; neither is inherently
more valuable than the other. Their long coexistence simply
underscores the limits of our understanding of human inter-
action. We can take some comfort from the fact that our culture
has not permitted either precedent to stand alone.
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